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Author SHA1 Message Date
Yeachan-Heo
cc8da08ad3 Restore Rust formatting compliance for origin/main
Run cargo fmt across the Rust workspace after rebasing onto origin/main so the branch matches rustfmt's current output and the CI formatter gate can pass again. This commit intentionally contains formatter output only and keeps it separate from the README brand refresh.

Constraint: origin/main was failing cargo fmt --all --check
Rejected: Manually format only the initially reported files | cargo fmt --all updated additional workspace files that are part of the formatter gate
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Do not mix behavior edits into formatter-only commits
Tested: cargo fmt --all --check
Tested: cargo test --all
Tested: git diff --check
2026-04-23 00:24:18 +00:00
Yeachan-Heo
e43c6b81db Celebrate the 188K-star milestone in the project brand surface
Refresh the root README hero so the repo acknowledges the 188K GitHub star milestone without turning the page into a campaign landing page. The change keeps the existing structure, sharpens the positioning copy, and adds a compact milestone section that fits the current documentation-first surface.

Constraint: Keep the redesign confined to the repo's primary marketing/docs entrypoint
Constraint: Avoid new assets, dependencies, or multi-page brand churn
Rejected: Broader multi-file docs refresh | exceeded the requested reviewable scope
Confidence: high
Scope-risk: narrow
Reversibility: clean
Directive: Keep milestone copy lightweight so future README updates can age it out without restructuring the page
Tested: git diff --check
Not-tested: Rendered GitHub HTML preview outside local markdown diff
2026-04-23 00:24:09 +00:00
14 changed files with 96 additions and 3403 deletions

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@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with co
- Frameworks: none detected from the supported starter markers.
## Verification
- Run Rust verification from repo root: `scripts/fmt.sh --check`; for formatting use `scripts/fmt.sh`. Run Rust clippy/tests from `rust/`: `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace`
- Run Rust verification from `rust/`: `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace`
- `src/` and `tests/` are both present; update both surfaces together when behavior changes.
## Repository shape

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@@ -1,5 +1,13 @@
# Claw Code
<p align="center">
<strong>188K GitHub stars and climbing.</strong>
</p>
<p align="center">
<strong>Rust-native agent execution for people who want speed, control, and a real terminal.</strong>
</p>
<p align="center">
<a href="https://github.com/ultraworkers/claw-code">ultraworkers/claw-code</a>
·
@@ -28,8 +36,21 @@
<img src="assets/claw-hero.jpeg" alt="Claw Code" width="300" />
</p>
Claw Code is the public Rust implementation of the `claw` CLI agent harness.
The canonical implementation lives in [`rust/`](./rust), and the current source of truth for this repository is **ultraworkers/claw-code**.
<p align="center">
Claw Code just crossed <strong>188,000 GitHub stars</strong>. This repo is the public Rust implementation of the <code>claw</code> CLI agent harness, built in the open with the UltraWorkers community.
</p>
<p align="center">
The canonical implementation lives in <a href="./rust/">rust/</a>, and the current source of truth for this repository is <strong>ultraworkers/claw-code</strong>.
</p>
## 188K and climbing
Thanks to everyone who starred, tested, reviewed, and pushed the project forward. Claw Code is focused on a straightforward promise: a fast local-first CLI agent runtime with native tools, inspectable behavior, and a Rust workspace that stays close to the metal.
- Native Rust workspace and CLI binary under [`rust/`](./rust)
- Local-first workflows for prompts, sessions, tooling, and parity validation
- Open development across the broader UltraWorkers ecosystem
> [!IMPORTANT]
> Start with [`USAGE.md`](./USAGE.md) for build, auth, CLI, session, and parity-harness workflows. Make `claw doctor` your first health check after building, use [`rust/README.md`](./rust/README.md) for crate-level details, read [`PARITY.md`](./PARITY.md) for the current Rust-port checkpoint, and see [`docs/container.md`](./docs/container.md) for the container-first workflow.

File diff suppressed because one or more lines are too long

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@@ -74,18 +74,6 @@ US-007 COMPLETE (Phase 5 - Plugin/MCP lifecycle maturity)
- DegradedMode behavior
- Tests: 11 unit tests passing
Iteration 2026-04-27 - ROADMAP #200 COMPLETED
------------------------------------------------
- Selected next actionable backlog item because no active task was in progress.
- ROADMAP #200: Interactive MCP/tool permission prompts are invisible blockers.
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/worker_boot.rs, rust/crates/runtime/src/recovery_recipes.rs, ROADMAP.md, progress.txt.
- Added tool_permission_required worker status and event classification for interactive MCP/tool permission gates.
- Added structured ToolPermissionPrompt payload with server/tool identity and prompt preview.
- Startup evidence now records tool_permission_prompt_detected and classifies timeout evidence as tool_permission_required.
- Readiness snapshots now mark tool-permission-gated workers as blocked, not ready/idle.
- Tests: targeted tool_permission regressions, full runtime test/clippy/fmt pending in Ralph verification loop.
VERIFICATION STATUS:
------------------
- cargo build --workspace: PASSED
@@ -120,29 +108,6 @@ US-010 COMPLETED (Add model compatibility documentation)
- Cross-referenced with existing code comments in openai_compat.rs
- cargo clippy passes
Iteration 3: 2026-04-16
------------------------
US-012 COMPLETED (Trust prompt resolver with allowlist auto-trust)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/trust_resolver.rs
- Enhanced TrustConfig with pattern matching and serde support:
- TrustAllowlistEntry struct with pattern, worktree_pattern, description
- TrustResolution enum (AutoAllowlisted, ManualApproval)
- Enhanced TrustEvent variants with serde tags and metadata
- Glob pattern matching with * and ? wildcards
- Support for path prefix matching and worktree patterns
- Updated TrustResolver with new resolve() signature:
- Added worktree parameter for worktree pattern matching
- Proper event emission with TrustResolution
- Manual approval detection from screen text
- Added helper functions:
- extract_repo_name() - extracts repo name from path
- detect_manual_approval() - detects manual trust from screen text
- glob_matches() - recursive backtracking glob matcher
- Tests: 25 new tests for pattern matching, serialization, and resolver behavior
- All 483 runtime tests pass
- cargo clippy passes with no warnings
US-011 COMPLETED (Performance optimization: reduce API request serialization overhead)
- Files:
- rust/crates/api/Cargo.toml (added criterion dev-dependency and bench config)
@@ -166,213 +131,3 @@ US-011 COMPLETED (Performance optimization: reduce API request serialization ove
- is_reasoning_model detection: ~26-42ns depending on model
- All tests pass (119 unit tests + 29 integration tests)
- cargo clippy passes
VERIFICATION STATUS (Iteration 3):
----------------------------------
- cargo build --workspace: PASSED
- cargo test --workspace: PASSED (891+ tests)
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings: PASSED
- cargo fmt -- --check: PASSED
All 12 stories from prd.json now have passes: true
- US-001 through US-007: Pre-existing implementations
- US-008: kimi-k2.5 model API compatibility fix
- US-009: Unit tests for kimi model compatibility
- US-010: Model compatibility documentation
- US-011: Performance optimization with criterion benchmarks
- US-012: Trust prompt resolver with allowlist auto-trust
Iteration 4: 2026-04-16
------------------------
US-013 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Session event ordering + terminal-state reconciliation)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Added EventTerminality enum (Terminal, Advisory, Uncertainty)
- Added classify_event_terminality() function for event classification
- Added reconcile_terminal_events() function for deterministic event ordering:
- Sorts events by monotonic sequence number
- Deduplicates terminal events by fingerprint
- Detects transport death uncertainty (terminal + transport death)
- Handles out-of-order event bursts
- Added events_materially_differ() for detecting meaningful differences
- Added 8 comprehensive tests for reconciliation logic:
- reconcile_terminal_events_sorts_by_monotonic_sequence
- reconcile_terminal_events_deduplicates_same_fingerprint
- reconcile_terminal_events_detects_transport_death_uncertainty
- reconcile_terminal_events_handles_completed_idle_error_completed_noise
- reconcile_terminal_events_returns_none_for_empty_input
- reconcile_terminal_events_preserves_advisory_events
- events_materially_differ_detects_real_differences
- classify_event_terminality_correctly_classifies
- Fixed test compilation issues with LaneEventBuilder API
VERIFICATION STATUS (Iteration 4):
----------------------------------
- cargo build --workspace: PASSED
- cargo test --workspace: PASSED (891+ tests)
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings: PASSED
- cargo fmt -- --check: PASSED
US-013 marked passes: true in prd.json
US-014 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Event provenance / environment labeling)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Added ConfidenceLevel enum (High, Medium, Low, Unknown)
- Added fields to LaneEventMetadata:
- environment_label: Option<String> - environment/channel (production, staging, dev)
- emitter_identity: Option<String> - emitter (clawd, plugin-name, operator-id)
- confidence_level: Option<ConfidenceLevel> - trust level for automation
- Added builder methods: with_environment(), with_emitter(), with_confidence()
- Added filtering functions:
- filter_by_provenance() - select events by source
- filter_by_environment() - select events by environment label
- filter_by_confidence() - select events above confidence threshold
- is_test_event() - check if synthetic source (test, healthcheck, replay)
- is_live_lane_event() - check if production event
- Added 7 comprehensive tests for US-014:
- confidence_level_round_trips_through_serialization
- filter_by_provenance_selects_only_matching_events
- filter_by_environment_selects_only_matching_environment
- filter_by_confidence_selects_events_above_threshold
- is_test_event_detects_synthetic_sources
- is_live_lane_event_detects_production_events
- lane_event_metadata_includes_us014_fields
US-016 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Duplicate terminal-event suppression)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Event fingerprinting already implemented via compute_event_fingerprint()
- Fingerprint attached via LaneEventMetadata.event_fingerprint
- Deduplication via dedupe_terminal_events() - returns first occurrence of each fingerprint
- Raw event history preserved separately from deduplicated actionable events
- Material difference detection via events_materially_differ():
- Different event type (Finished vs Failed) is material
- Different status is material
- Different failure class is material
- Different data payload is material
- Reconcile function surfaces latest terminal event when materially different
- Added 5 comprehensive tests for US-016:
- canonical_terminal_event_fingerprint_attached_to_metadata
- dedupe_terminal_events_suppresses_repeated_fingerprints
- dedupe_preserves_raw_event_history_separately
- events_materially_differ_detects_payload_differences
- reconcile_terminal_events_surfaces_latest_when_different
US-017 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Lane ownership / scope binding)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- LaneOwnership struct already existed with:
- owner: String - owner/assignee identity
- workflow_scope: String - workflow scope (claw-code-dogfood, etc.)
- watcher_action: WatcherAction - Act, Observe, Ignore
- Ownership preserved through lifecycle via with_ownership() builder method
- All lifecycle events (Started -> Ready -> Finished) preserve ownership
- Added 3 comprehensive tests for US-017:
- lane_ownership_attached_to_metadata
- lane_ownership_preserved_through_lifecycle_events
- lane_ownership_watcher_action_variants
US-015 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Session identity completeness at creation time)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- SessionIdentity struct already existed with:
- title: String - stable title for the session
- workspace: String - workspace/worktree path
- purpose: String - lane/session purpose
- placeholder_reason: Option<String> - reason for placeholder values
- Added reconcile_enriched() method for updating session identity:
- Updates title/workspace/purpose with newly available data
- Clears placeholder_reason when real values are provided
- Preserves existing values for fields not being updated
- Allows incremental enrichment without ambiguity
- Added 2 comprehensive tests:
- session_identity_reconcile_enriched_updates_fields
- session_identity_reconcile_preserves_placeholder_if_no_new_data
US-018 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Nudge acknowledgment / dedupe contract)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Added NudgeTracking struct:
- nudge_id: String - unique nudge identifier
- delivered_at: String - timestamp of delivery
- acknowledged: bool - whether acknowledged
- acknowledged_at: Option<String> - when acknowledged
- is_retry: bool - whether this is a retry
- original_nudge_id: Option<String> - original ID if retry
- Added NudgeClassification enum (New, Retry, StaleDuplicate)
- Added classify_nudge() function for deduplication logic
- Added 6 comprehensive tests for US-018
US-019 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Stable roadmap-id assignment)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Added RoadmapId struct:
- id: String - canonical unique identifier
- filed_at: String - timestamp when filed
- is_new_filing: bool - new vs update
- supersedes: Option<String> - lineage for supersedes
- Added builder methods: new_filing(), update(), supersedes()
- Added 3 comprehensive tests for US-019
US-020 COMPLETED (Phase 2 - Roadmap item lifecycle state contract)
- Files: rust/crates/runtime/src/lane_events.rs
- Added RoadmapLifecycleState enum (Filed, Acknowledged, InProgress, Blocked, Done, Superseded)
- Added RoadmapLifecycle struct:
- state: RoadmapLifecycleState - current state
- state_changed_at: String - last transition timestamp
- filed_at: String - original filing timestamp
- lineage: Vec<String> - supersession chain
- Added methods: new_filed(), transition(), superseded_by(), is_terminal(), is_active()
- Added 5 comprehensive tests for US-020
VERIFICATION STATUS (Iteration 7):
----------------------------------
- cargo build --workspace: PASSED
- cargo test --workspace: PASSED (891+ tests)
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings: PASSED
- cargo fmt -- --check: PASSED
US-013 through US-015 and US-018 through US-020 now marked passes: true
FINAL VERIFICATION (All 20 Stories Complete):
------------------------------------------------
- cargo build --workspace: PASSED
- cargo test --workspace: PASSED (119+ API tests, 39 runtime tests, 12 integration tests)
- cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings: PASSED
- cargo fmt -- --check: PASSED
ALL 20 STORIES FROM PRD COMPLETE:
- US-001 through US-012: Pre-existing implementations (verified working)
- US-013: Session event ordering + terminal-state reconciliation
- US-014: Event provenance / environment labeling
- US-015: Session identity completeness at creation time
- US-016: Duplicate terminal-event suppression
- US-017: Lane ownership / scope binding
- US-018: Nudge acknowledgment / dedupe contract
- US-019: Stable roadmap-id assignment
- US-020: Roadmap item lifecycle state contract
Iteration 8: 2026-04-16
------------------------
US-021 COMPLETED (Request body size pre-flight check - from dogfood findings)
- Files:
- rust/crates/api/src/error.rs (new error variant)
- rust/crates/api/src/providers/openai_compat.rs
- Added RequestBodySizeExceeded error variant with actionable message
- Added max_request_body_bytes to OpenAiCompatConfig:
- DashScope: 6MB (6_291_456 bytes) - from dogfood with kimi-k2.5
- OpenAI: 100MB (104_857_600 bytes)
- xAI: 50MB (52_428_800 bytes)
- Added estimate_request_body_size() for pre-flight checks
- Added check_request_body_size() for validation
- Pre-flight check integrated in send_raw_request()
- Tests: 5 new tests for size estimation and limit checking
PROJECT STATUS: COMPLETE (21/21 stories)
Iteration 2026-04-29 - ROADMAP #96 COMPLETED
------------------------------------------------
- Pulled origin/main: already up to date.
- Selected ROADMAP #96 as a small repo-local Immediate Backlog item: the `claw --help` Resume-safe command summary leaked slash-command stubs despite the main Interactive command listing filtering them.
- Files: rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/main.rs, ROADMAP.md, progress.txt.
- Changed help rendering to filter `resume_supported_slash_commands()` through `STUB_COMMANDS` before building the Resume-safe one-liner.
- Added `stub_commands_absent_from_resume_safe_help` regression coverage so future stub additions cannot leak into the Resume-safe summary.
- Targeted verification: `cargo test -p rusty-claude-cli stub_commands_absent_from_resume_safe_help -- --nocapture` passed; `cargo test -p rusty-claude-cli parses_direct_cli_actions -- --nocapture` passed.
- Format/check verification: `cargo fmt --all --check`, `git diff --check`, and `cargo check -p rusty-claude-cli` passed.
- Broader clippy note: `cargo clippy -p rusty-claude-cli --all-targets -- -D warnings` is blocked by pre-existing `clippy::unnecessary_wraps` failures in `rust/crates/commands/src/lib.rs` (`render_mcp_report_for`, `render_mcp_report_json_for`), outside this diff.

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@@ -7,8 +7,7 @@ This file provides guidance to Claw Code (clawcode.dev) when working with code i
- Frameworks: none detected from the supported starter markers.
## Verification
- From the repository root, run Rust formatting with `scripts/fmt.sh` (or `scripts/fmt.sh --check` for CI-style checks). From this `rust/` directory, the equivalent command is `../scripts/fmt.sh`. Root-level `cargo fmt --manifest-path rust/Cargo.toml` is not the supported formatting command.
- From this `rust/` directory, run Rust verification with `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings` and `cargo test --workspace`.
- Run Rust verification from the repo root: `cargo fmt`, `cargo clippy --workspace --all-targets -- -D warnings`, `cargo test --workspace`
## Working agreement
- Prefer small, reviewable changes and keep generated bootstrap files aligned with actual repo workflows.

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@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ fn detect_and_emit_ship_prepared(command: &str) {
actor: get_git_actor().unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string()),
pr_number: None,
};
let _event = LaneEvent::ship_prepared(format!("{now}"), &provenance);
let _event = LaneEvent::ship_prepared(format!("{}", now), &provenance);
// Log to stderr as interim routing before event stream integration
eprintln!(
"[ship.prepared] branch={} -> main, commits={}, actor={}",

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

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@@ -45,9 +45,7 @@ impl FailureScenario {
#[must_use]
pub fn from_worker_failure_kind(kind: WorkerFailureKind) -> Self {
match kind {
WorkerFailureKind::TrustGate | WorkerFailureKind::ToolPermissionGate => {
Self::TrustPromptUnresolved
}
WorkerFailureKind::TrustGate => Self::TrustPromptUnresolved,
WorkerFailureKind::PromptDelivery => Self::PromptMisdelivery,
WorkerFailureKind::Protocol => Self::McpHandshakeFailure,
WorkerFailureKind::Provider | WorkerFailureKind::StartupNoEvidence => {

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@@ -1,7 +1,5 @@
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
const TRUST_PROMPT_CUES: &[&str] = &[
"do you trust the files in this folder",
"trust the files in this folder",
@@ -10,121 +8,24 @@ const TRUST_PROMPT_CUES: &[&str] = &[
"yes, proceed",
];
/// Resolution method for trust decisions.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum TrustPolicy {
/// Automatically trust this path (allowlisted)
AutoTrust,
/// Require manual approval
RequireApproval,
/// Deny trust for this path
Deny,
}
/// Events emitted during trust resolution lifecycle.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum TrustEvent {
/// Trust prompt was detected and is required
TrustRequired {
/// Current working directory where trust is needed
cwd: String,
/// Optional repo identifier
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
repo: Option<String>,
/// Optional worktree path
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
worktree: Option<String>,
},
/// Trust was resolved (granted)
TrustResolved {
/// Current working directory
cwd: String,
/// The policy that was applied
policy: TrustPolicy,
/// How the trust was resolved
resolution: TrustResolution,
},
/// Trust was denied
TrustDenied {
/// Current working directory
cwd: String,
/// Reason for denial
reason: String,
},
TrustRequired { cwd: String },
TrustResolved { cwd: String, policy: TrustPolicy },
TrustDenied { cwd: String, reason: String },
}
/// How trust was resolved.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum TrustResolution {
/// Automatically granted due to allowlist
AutoAllowlisted,
/// Manually approved by user
ManualApproval,
}
/// Entry in the trust allowlist with pattern matching support.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TrustAllowlistEntry {
/// Repository path or glob pattern to match
pub pattern: String,
/// Optional worktree subpath pattern
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub worktree_pattern: Option<String>,
/// Human-readable description of why this is allowlisted
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub description: Option<String>,
}
impl TrustAllowlistEntry {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(pattern: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self {
pattern: pattern.into(),
worktree_pattern: None,
description: None,
}
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_worktree_pattern(mut self, pattern: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.worktree_pattern = Some(pattern.into());
self
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_description(mut self, desc: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.description = Some(desc.into());
self
}
}
/// Configuration for trust resolution with allowlist/denylist support.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct TrustConfig {
/// Allowlisted paths with pattern matching
pub allowlisted: Vec<TrustAllowlistEntry>,
/// Denied paths (exact or prefix matches)
pub denied: Vec<PathBuf>,
/// Whether to emit events for trust decisions
#[serde(default = "default_emit_events")]
pub emit_events: bool,
}
fn default_emit_events() -> bool {
true
}
impl Default for TrustConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
allowlisted: Vec::new(),
denied: Vec::new(),
emit_events: true,
}
}
allowlisted: Vec<PathBuf>,
denied: Vec<PathBuf>,
}
impl TrustConfig {
@@ -134,14 +35,8 @@ impl TrustConfig {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_allowlisted(mut self, path: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
self.allowlisted.push(TrustAllowlistEntry::new(path));
self
}
#[must_use]
pub fn with_allowlisted_entry(mut self, entry: TrustAllowlistEntry) -> Self {
self.allowlisted.push(entry);
pub fn with_allowlisted(mut self, path: impl Into<PathBuf>) -> Self {
self.allowlisted.push(path.into());
self
}
@@ -150,147 +45,6 @@ impl TrustConfig {
self.denied.push(path.into());
self
}
/// Check if a path matches an allowlisted entry using glob patterns.
#[must_use]
pub fn is_allowlisted(
&self,
cwd: &str,
worktree: Option<&str>,
) -> Option<&TrustAllowlistEntry> {
self.allowlisted.iter().find(|entry| {
let path_matches = Self::pattern_matches(&entry.pattern, cwd);
if !path_matches {
return false;
}
match (&entry.worktree_pattern, worktree) {
(Some(wt_pattern), Some(wt)) => Self::pattern_matches(wt_pattern, wt),
(Some(_), None) => false,
(None, _) => true,
}
})
}
/// Match a pattern against a path string.
/// Supports exact matching and glob patterns (* and ?).
fn pattern_matches(pattern: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
let pattern = pattern.trim();
let path = path.trim();
// Exact match
if pattern == path {
return true;
}
// Normalize paths for comparison
let pattern_normalized = pattern.replace("//", "/");
let path_normalized = path.replace("//", "/");
// Check if pattern is a path prefix (e.g., "/tmp/worktrees" matches "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a")
// This handles the common case of directory containment
if !pattern_normalized.contains('*') && !pattern_normalized.contains('?') {
// Prefix match: pattern is a directory that contains path
if path_normalized.starts_with(&pattern_normalized) {
let rest = &path_normalized[pattern_normalized.len()..];
// Must be exact match or continue with /
return rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with('/');
}
}
// Check if pattern ends with wildcard (prefix match)
if pattern_normalized.ends_with("/*") {
let prefix = pattern_normalized.trim_end_matches("/*");
if let Some(rest) = path_normalized.strip_prefix(prefix) {
// Must either be exact match or continue with /
return rest.is_empty() || rest.starts_with('/');
}
} else if pattern_normalized.ends_with('*') && !pattern_normalized.contains("/*/") {
// Simple trailing * (not a path component wildcard)
let prefix = pattern_normalized.trim_end_matches('*');
if let Some(rest) = path_normalized.strip_prefix(prefix) {
return rest.is_empty() || !rest.starts_with('/');
}
}
// Check if pattern is a path component match (bounded by /)
if path_normalized
.split('/')
.any(|component| component == pattern_normalized)
{
return true;
}
// Check if pattern appears as a substring within a path component
// (e.g., "repo" matches "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a")
if path_normalized
.split('/')
.any(|component| component.contains(&pattern_normalized))
{
return true;
}
// Glob matching for patterns with ? or * in the middle
if pattern.contains('?') || pattern.contains("/*/") || pattern.starts_with("*/") {
return Self::glob_matches(&pattern_normalized, &path_normalized);
}
false
}
/// Simple glob pattern matching (? matches single char, * matches any sequence).
/// Handles patterns like /tmp/*/repo-* where * matches path components.
fn glob_matches(pattern: &str, path: &str) -> bool {
// Use recursive backtracking for proper glob matching
Self::glob_match_recursive(pattern, path, 0, 0)
}
fn glob_match_recursive(pattern: &str, path: &str, p_idx: usize, s_idx: usize) -> bool {
let p_chars: Vec<char> = pattern.chars().collect();
let s_chars: Vec<char> = path.chars().collect();
let mut p = p_idx;
let mut s = s_idx;
while p < p_chars.len() {
match p_chars[p] {
'*' => {
// Try all possible matches for *
p += 1;
if p >= p_chars.len() {
// * at end matches everything remaining
return true;
}
// Try matching 0 or more characters
for skip in 0..=(s_chars.len() - s) {
if Self::glob_match_recursive(pattern, path, p, s + skip) {
return true;
}
}
return false;
}
'?' => {
// ? matches exactly one character
if s >= s_chars.len() {
return false;
}
p += 1;
s += 1;
}
c => {
// Exact character match
if s >= s_chars.len() || s_chars[s] != c {
return false;
}
p += 1;
s += 1;
}
}
}
// Pattern exhausted - path must also be exhausted
s >= s_chars.len()
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -332,19 +86,15 @@ impl TrustResolver {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn resolve(&self, cwd: &str, worktree: Option<&str>, screen_text: &str) -> TrustDecision {
pub fn resolve(&self, cwd: &str, screen_text: &str) -> TrustDecision {
if !detect_trust_prompt(screen_text) {
return TrustDecision::NotRequired;
}
let repo = extract_repo_name(cwd);
let mut events = vec![TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
repo: repo.clone(),
worktree: worktree.map(String::from),
}];
// Check denylist first
if let Some(matched_root) = self
.config
.denied
@@ -362,12 +112,15 @@ impl TrustResolver {
};
}
// Check allowlist with pattern matching
if self.config.is_allowlisted(cwd, worktree).is_some() {
if self
.config
.allowlisted
.iter()
.any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
{
events.push(TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
});
return TrustDecision::Required {
policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
@@ -375,19 +128,6 @@ impl TrustResolver {
};
}
// Check for manual trust resolution via screen text analysis
if detect_manual_approval(screen_text) {
events.push(TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
cwd: cwd.to_owned(),
policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
resolution: TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
});
return TrustDecision::Required {
policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
events,
};
}
TrustDecision::Required {
policy: TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
events,
@@ -395,20 +135,17 @@ impl TrustResolver {
}
#[must_use]
pub fn trusts(&self, cwd: &str, worktree: Option<&str>) -> bool {
// Check denylist first
let denied = self
pub fn trusts(&self, cwd: &str) -> bool {
!self
.config
.denied
.iter()
.any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root));
if denied {
return false;
}
// Check allowlist using pattern matching
self.config.is_allowlisted(cwd, worktree).is_some()
.any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
&& self
.config
.allowlisted
.iter()
.any(|root| path_matches(cwd, root))
}
}
@@ -435,240 +172,11 @@ fn normalize_path(path: &Path) -> PathBuf {
std::fs::canonicalize(path).unwrap_or_else(|_| path.to_path_buf())
}
/// Extract repository name from a path for event context.
fn extract_repo_name(cwd: &str) -> Option<String> {
let path = Path::new(cwd);
// Try to find a .git directory to identify repo root
let mut current = Some(path);
while let Some(p) = current {
if p.join(".git").is_dir() {
return p.file_name().map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string());
}
current = p.parent();
}
// Fallback: use the last component of the path
path.file_name().map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().to_string())
}
/// Detect if the screen text indicates manual approval was granted.
fn detect_manual_approval(screen_text: &str) -> bool {
let lowered = screen_text.to_ascii_lowercase();
// Look for indicators that user manually approved
MANUAL_APPROVAL_CUES.iter().any(|cue| lowered.contains(cue))
}
const MANUAL_APPROVAL_CUES: &[&str] = &[
"yes, i trust",
"i trust this",
"trusted manually",
"approval granted",
];
#[cfg(test)]
mod path_matching_tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn glob_pattern_star_matches_any_sequence() {
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/tmp/foo"));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/tmp/bar/baz"));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/*", "/other/tmp/foo"));
}
#[test]
fn glob_pattern_question_matches_single_char() {
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test1"));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/testA"));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test12"));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches("/tmp/test?", "/tmp/test"));
}
#[test]
fn pattern_matches_exact() {
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/worktrees",
"/tmp/worktrees"
));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/worktrees",
"/tmp/worktrees-other"
));
}
#[test]
fn pattern_matches_prefix_with_wildcard() {
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/worktrees/*",
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/worktrees/*",
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/subdir"
));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/worktrees/*",
"/tmp/other/repo"
));
}
#[test]
fn pattern_matches_contains() {
// Pattern contained within path
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"worktrees",
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"repo",
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a"
));
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_entry_with_worktree_pattern() {
let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(
TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*")
.with_worktree_pattern("*/.git")
.with_description("Git worktrees"),
);
// Should match when both patterns match
assert!(config
.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", Some("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/.git"))
.is_some());
// Should not match when worktree pattern doesn't match
assert!(config
.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", Some("/other/path"))
.is_none());
// Should not match when a worktree pattern is required but no worktree is supplied
assert!(config
.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None)
.is_none());
// Should match when no worktree pattern required and path matches
let config_no_worktree = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*");
assert!(config_no_worktree
.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None)
.is_some());
}
#[test]
fn allowlist_entry_returns_matched_entry() {
let entry = TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*").with_description("Test worktrees");
let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(entry.clone());
let matched = config.is_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None);
assert!(matched.is_some());
assert_eq!(
matched.unwrap().description,
Some("Test worktrees".to_string())
);
}
#[test]
fn complex_glob_patterns() {
// Multiple wildcards
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/*/repo-*",
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-123"
));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/*/repo-*",
"/tmp/other/repo-abc"
));
assert!(!TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/*/repo-*",
"/tmp/worktrees/other"
));
// Mixed ? and *
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/test?/*.txt",
"/tmp/test1/file.txt"
));
assert!(TrustConfig::pattern_matches(
"/tmp/test?/*.txt",
"/tmp/testA/subdir/file.txt"
));
}
#[test]
fn serde_serialization_roundtrip() {
let config = TrustConfig::new()
.with_allowlisted_entry(
TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*")
.with_worktree_pattern("*/.git")
.with_description("Git worktrees"),
)
.with_denied("/tmp/malicious");
let json = serde_json::to_string(&config).expect("serialization failed");
let deserialized: TrustConfig =
serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
assert_eq!(config.allowlisted.len(), deserialized.allowlisted.len());
assert_eq!(config.denied.len(), deserialized.denied.len());
assert_eq!(config.emit_events, deserialized.emit_events);
}
#[test]
fn trust_event_serialization() {
let event = TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd: "/tmp/test".to_string(),
repo: Some("test-repo".to_string()),
worktree: Some("/tmp/test/.git".to_string()),
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&event).expect("serialization failed");
assert!(json.contains("trust_required"));
assert!(json.contains("/tmp/test"));
assert!(json.contains("test-repo"));
let deserialized: TrustEvent = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
match deserialized {
TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd,
repo,
worktree,
} => {
assert_eq!(cwd, "/tmp/test");
assert_eq!(repo, Some("test-repo".to_string()));
assert_eq!(worktree, Some("/tmp/test/.git".to_string()));
}
_ => panic!("wrong event type"),
}
}
#[test]
fn trust_event_resolved_serialization() {
let event = TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
cwd: "/tmp/test".to_string(),
policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
};
let json = serde_json::to_string(&event).expect("serialization failed");
assert!(json.contains("trust_resolved"));
assert!(json.contains("auto_allowlisted"));
let deserialized: TrustEvent = serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
match deserialized {
TrustEvent::TrustResolved { resolution, .. } => {
assert_eq!(resolution, TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted);
}
_ => panic!("wrong event type"),
}
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::{
detect_manual_approval, detect_trust_prompt, path_matches_trusted_root,
TrustAllowlistEntry, TrustConfig, TrustDecision, TrustEvent, TrustPolicy, TrustResolution,
TrustResolver,
detect_trust_prompt, path_matches_trusted_root, TrustConfig, TrustDecision, TrustEvent,
TrustPolicy, TrustResolver,
};
#[test]
@@ -689,7 +197,7 @@ mod tests {
let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees"));
// when
let decision = resolver.resolve("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", None, "Ready for your input\n>");
let decision = resolver.resolve("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a", "Ready for your input\n>");
// then
assert_eq!(decision, TrustDecision::NotRequired);
@@ -705,23 +213,23 @@ mod tests {
// when
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
None,
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
);
// then
assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
let events = decision.events();
assert_eq!(events.len(), 2);
assert!(matches!(events[0], TrustEvent::TrustRequired { .. }));
assert!(matches!(
events[1],
TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
resolution: TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
..
}
));
assert_eq!(
decision.events(),
&[
TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a".to_string(),
},
TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-a".to_string(),
policy: TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
},
]
);
}
#[test]
@@ -732,7 +240,6 @@ mod tests {
// when
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/other/repo-b",
None,
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
);
@@ -742,8 +249,6 @@ mod tests {
decision.events(),
&[TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd: "/tmp/other/repo-b".to_string(),
repo: Some("repo-b".to_string()),
worktree: None,
}]
);
}
@@ -760,7 +265,6 @@ mod tests {
// when
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-c",
None,
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
);
@@ -771,8 +275,6 @@ mod tests {
&[
TrustEvent::TrustRequired {
cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-c".to_string(),
repo: Some("repo-c".to_string()),
worktree: None,
},
TrustEvent::TrustDenied {
cwd: "/tmp/worktrees/repo-c".to_string(),
@@ -782,66 +284,6 @@ mod tests {
);
}
#[test]
fn auto_trusts_with_glob_pattern_allowlist() {
// given
let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*"));
// when - any repo under /tmp/worktrees should auto-trust
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
None,
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
);
// then
assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
}
#[test]
fn resolve_with_worktree_pattern_matching() {
// given
let config = TrustConfig::new().with_allowlisted_entry(
TrustAllowlistEntry::new("/tmp/worktrees/*").with_worktree_pattern("*/.git"),
);
let resolver = TrustResolver::new(config);
// when - with worktree that matches the pattern
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/worktrees/repo-a",
Some("/tmp/worktrees/repo-a/.git"),
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\n1. Yes, proceed\n2. No",
);
// then - should auto-trust because both patterns match
assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::AutoTrust));
}
#[test]
fn manual_approval_detected_from_screen_text() {
// given
let resolver = TrustResolver::new(TrustConfig::new());
// when - screen text indicates manual approval
let decision = resolver.resolve(
"/tmp/some/repo",
None,
"Do you trust the files in this folder?\nUser selected: Yes, I trust this folder",
);
// then - should detect manual approval
assert_eq!(decision.policy(), Some(TrustPolicy::RequireApproval));
let events = decision.events();
assert!(events.len() >= 2);
assert!(matches!(
events[events.len() - 1],
TrustEvent::TrustResolved {
resolution: TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
..
}
));
}
#[test]
fn sibling_prefix_does_not_match_trusted_root() {
// given
@@ -854,70 +296,4 @@ mod tests {
// then
assert!(!matched);
}
#[test]
fn detects_manual_approval_cues() {
assert!(detect_manual_approval(
"User selected: Yes, I trust this folder"
));
assert!(detect_manual_approval(
"I trust this repository and its contents"
));
assert!(detect_manual_approval("Approval granted by user"));
assert!(!detect_manual_approval(
"Do you trust the files in this folder?"
));
assert!(!detect_manual_approval("Some unrelated text"));
}
#[test]
fn trust_config_default_emit_events() {
let config = TrustConfig::default();
assert!(config.emit_events);
}
#[test]
fn trust_resolver_trusts_method() {
let resolver = TrustResolver::new(
TrustConfig::new()
.with_allowlisted("/tmp/worktrees/*")
.with_denied("/tmp/worktrees/bad-repo"),
);
// Should trust allowlisted paths
assert!(resolver.trusts("/tmp/worktrees/good-repo", None));
// Should not trust denied paths
assert!(!resolver.trusts("/tmp/worktrees/bad-repo", None));
// Should not trust unknown paths
assert!(!resolver.trusts("/tmp/other/repo", None));
}
#[test]
fn trust_policy_serde_roundtrip() {
for policy in [
TrustPolicy::AutoTrust,
TrustPolicy::RequireApproval,
TrustPolicy::Deny,
] {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&policy).expect("serialization failed");
let deserialized: TrustPolicy =
serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
assert_eq!(policy, deserialized);
}
}
#[test]
fn trust_resolution_serde_roundtrip() {
for resolution in [
TrustResolution::AutoAllowlisted,
TrustResolution::ManualApproval,
] {
let json = serde_json::to_string(&resolution).expect("serialization failed");
let deserialized: TrustResolution =
serde_json::from_str(&json).expect("deserialization failed");
assert_eq!(resolution, deserialized);
}
}
}

View File

@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@ fn now_secs() -> u64 {
pub enum WorkerStatus {
Spawning,
TrustRequired,
ToolPermissionRequired,
ReadyForPrompt,
Running,
Finished,
@@ -42,7 +41,6 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for WorkerStatus {
match self {
Self::Spawning => write!(f, "spawning"),
Self::TrustRequired => write!(f, "trust_required"),
Self::ToolPermissionRequired => write!(f, "tool_permission_required"),
Self::ReadyForPrompt => write!(f, "ready_for_prompt"),
Self::Running => write!(f, "running"),
Self::Finished => write!(f, "finished"),
@@ -55,7 +53,6 @@ impl std::fmt::Display for WorkerStatus {
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum WorkerFailureKind {
TrustGate,
ToolPermissionGate,
PromptDelivery,
Protocol,
Provider,
@@ -74,7 +71,6 @@ pub struct WorkerFailure {
pub enum WorkerEventKind {
Spawning,
TrustRequired,
ToolPermissionRequired,
TrustResolved,
ReadyForPrompt,
PromptMisdelivery,
@@ -108,8 +104,6 @@ pub enum WorkerPromptTarget {
pub enum StartupFailureClassification {
/// Trust prompt is required but not detected/resolved
TrustRequired,
/// Tool permission prompt is required before startup can continue
ToolPermissionRequired,
/// Prompt was delivered to wrong target (shell misdelivery)
PromptMisdelivery,
/// Prompt was sent but acceptance timed out
@@ -136,14 +130,6 @@ pub struct StartupEvidenceBundle {
pub prompt_acceptance_state: bool,
/// Result of trust prompt detection at timeout
pub trust_prompt_detected: bool,
/// Result of tool permission prompt detection at timeout
pub tool_permission_prompt_detected: bool,
/// Age in seconds of the latest tool permission prompt, when observed
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: Option<u64>,
/// Whether the prompt surface exposed only a session allow path or also an always-allow path
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
pub tool_permission_allow_scope: Option<ToolPermissionAllowScope>,
/// Transport health summary (true = healthy/responsive)
pub transport_healthy: bool,
/// MCP health summary (true = all servers healthy)
@@ -160,15 +146,6 @@ pub enum WorkerEventPayload {
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
resolution: Option<WorkerTrustResolution>,
},
ToolPermissionPrompt {
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
server_name: Option<String>,
#[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
tool_name: Option<String>,
prompt_age_seconds: u64,
allow_scope: ToolPermissionAllowScope,
prompt_preview: String,
},
PromptDelivery {
prompt_preview: String,
observed_target: WorkerPromptTarget,
@@ -186,14 +163,6 @@ pub enum WorkerEventPayload {
},
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum ToolPermissionAllowScope {
SessionOnly,
SessionOrAlways,
Unknown,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct WorkerTaskReceipt {
pub repo: String,
@@ -307,29 +276,6 @@ impl WorkerRegistry {
.ok_or_else(|| format!("worker not found: {worker_id}"))?;
let lowered = screen_text.to_ascii_lowercase();
if let Some(tool_prompt) = detect_tool_permission_prompt(screen_text, &lowered) {
worker.status = WorkerStatus::ToolPermissionRequired;
worker.last_error = Some(WorkerFailure {
kind: WorkerFailureKind::ToolPermissionGate,
message: tool_prompt.message(),
created_at: now_secs(),
});
push_event(
worker,
WorkerEventKind::ToolPermissionRequired,
WorkerStatus::ToolPermissionRequired,
Some("tool permission prompt detected".to_string()),
Some(WorkerEventPayload::ToolPermissionPrompt {
server_name: tool_prompt.server_name,
tool_name: tool_prompt.tool_name,
prompt_age_seconds: 0,
allow_scope: tool_prompt.allow_scope,
prompt_preview: tool_prompt.prompt_preview,
}),
);
return Ok(worker.clone());
}
if !worker.trust_gate_cleared && detect_trust_prompt(&lowered) {
worker.status = WorkerStatus::TrustRequired;
worker.last_error = Some(WorkerFailure {
@@ -557,9 +503,7 @@ impl WorkerRegistry {
ready: worker.status == WorkerStatus::ReadyForPrompt,
blocked: matches!(
worker.status,
WorkerStatus::TrustRequired
| WorkerStatus::ToolPermissionRequired
| WorkerStatus::Failed
WorkerStatus::TrustRequired | WorkerStatus::Failed
),
replay_prompt_ready: worker.replay_prompt.is_some(),
last_error: worker.last_error.clone(),
@@ -680,18 +624,6 @@ impl WorkerRegistry {
let now = now_secs();
let elapsed = now.saturating_sub(worker.created_at);
let latest_tool_permission_event = worker
.events
.iter()
.rev()
.find(|event| event.kind == WorkerEventKind::ToolPermissionRequired);
let tool_permission_allow_scope =
latest_tool_permission_event.and_then(|event| match &event.payload {
Some(WorkerEventPayload::ToolPermissionPrompt { allow_scope, .. }) => {
Some(*allow_scope)
}
_ => None,
});
// Build evidence bundle
let evidence = StartupEvidenceBundle {
@@ -708,13 +640,6 @@ impl WorkerRegistry {
.events
.iter()
.any(|e| e.kind == WorkerEventKind::TrustRequired),
tool_permission_prompt_detected: worker
.events
.iter()
.any(|e| e.kind == WorkerEventKind::ToolPermissionRequired),
tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: latest_tool_permission_event
.map(|event| now.saturating_sub(event.timestamp)),
tool_permission_allow_scope,
transport_healthy,
mcp_healthy,
elapsed_seconds: elapsed,
@@ -769,13 +694,6 @@ fn classify_startup_failure(evidence: &StartupEvidenceBundle) -> StartupFailureC
return StartupFailureClassification::TrustRequired;
}
// Check for tool permission prompts that were not resolved
if evidence.tool_permission_prompt_detected
&& evidence.last_lifecycle_state == WorkerStatus::ToolPermissionRequired
{
return StartupFailureClassification::ToolPermissionRequired;
}
// Check for prompt acceptance timeout
if evidence.prompt_sent_at.is_some()
&& !evidence.prompt_acceptance_state
@@ -897,140 +815,6 @@ fn normalize_path(path: &str) -> PathBuf {
std::fs::canonicalize(path).unwrap_or_else(|_| Path::new(path).to_path_buf())
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct ToolPermissionPromptObservation {
server_name: Option<String>,
tool_name: Option<String>,
allow_scope: ToolPermissionAllowScope,
prompt_preview: String,
}
impl ToolPermissionPromptObservation {
fn message(&self) -> String {
match (&self.server_name, &self.tool_name) {
(Some(server), Some(tool)) => {
format!("worker boot blocked on tool permission prompt for {server}.{tool}")
}
(Some(server), None) => {
format!("worker boot blocked on tool permission prompt for {server}")
}
(None, Some(tool)) => {
format!("worker boot blocked on tool permission prompt for {tool}")
}
(None, None) => "worker boot blocked on tool permission prompt".to_string(),
}
}
}
fn detect_tool_permission_prompt(
screen_text: &str,
lowered: &str,
) -> Option<ToolPermissionPromptObservation> {
let looks_like_prompt = lowered.contains("allow the")
&& lowered.contains("server")
&& lowered.contains("tool")
&& lowered.contains("run");
let looks_like_tool_gate = lowered.contains("allow tool") && lowered.contains("run");
if !looks_like_prompt && !looks_like_tool_gate {
return None;
}
let prompt_line = screen_text
.lines()
.rev()
.find(|line| {
let lowered_line = line.to_ascii_lowercase();
lowered_line.contains("allow")
&& lowered_line.contains("tool")
&& (lowered_line.contains("run") || lowered_line.contains("server"))
})
.unwrap_or(screen_text)
.trim();
let tool_name = extract_quoted_value(prompt_line)
.or_else(|| extract_after(prompt_line, "tool ").map(|token| normalize_tool_token(&token)));
let server_name = extract_between(prompt_line, "the ", " server")
.map(|server| server.trim_end_matches(" MCP").to_string())
.or_else(|| {
tool_name
.as_deref()
.and_then(extract_server_from_qualified_tool)
});
Some(ToolPermissionPromptObservation {
server_name,
tool_name,
allow_scope: detect_tool_permission_allow_scope(lowered),
prompt_preview: prompt_preview(prompt_line),
})
}
fn detect_tool_permission_allow_scope(lowered: &str) -> ToolPermissionAllowScope {
let always_allow_capable = [
"always allow",
"allow always",
"allow this tool always",
"allow for all sessions",
]
.iter()
.any(|needle| lowered.contains(needle));
if always_allow_capable {
return ToolPermissionAllowScope::SessionOrAlways;
}
let session_allow_capable = [
"allow once",
"allow for this session",
"allow this session",
"yes, allow",
]
.iter()
.any(|needle| lowered.contains(needle));
if session_allow_capable {
ToolPermissionAllowScope::SessionOnly
} else {
ToolPermissionAllowScope::Unknown
}
}
fn extract_quoted_value(text: &str) -> Option<String> {
let start = text.find('"')? + 1;
let rest = &text[start..];
let end = rest.find('"')?;
Some(rest[..end].to_string())
}
fn extract_between(text: &str, prefix: &str, suffix: &str) -> Option<String> {
let start = text.find(prefix)? + prefix.len();
let rest = &text[start..];
let end = rest.find(suffix)?;
let value = rest[..end].trim();
(!value.is_empty()).then(|| value.to_string())
}
fn extract_after(text: &str, prefix: &str) -> Option<String> {
let start = text.to_ascii_lowercase().find(prefix)? + prefix.len();
let value = text[start..]
.split_whitespace()
.next()?
.trim_matches(|ch: char| ch == '?' || ch == ':' || ch == '"' || ch == '\'');
(!value.is_empty()).then(|| value.to_string())
}
fn normalize_tool_token(token: &str) -> String {
token
.trim_matches(|ch: char| ch == '?' || ch == ':' || ch == '"' || ch == '\'')
.to_string()
}
fn extract_server_from_qualified_tool(tool: &str) -> Option<String> {
let rest = tool.strip_prefix("mcp__")?;
let (server, _) = rest.split_once("__")?;
(!server.is_empty()).then(|| server.to_string())
}
fn detect_trust_prompt(lowered: &str) -> bool {
[
"do you trust the files in this folder",
@@ -1350,96 +1134,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(detect_ready_for_prompt("│ >", "│ >"));
}
#[test]
fn tool_permission_prompt_blocks_worker_with_structured_event() {
let registry = WorkerRegistry::new();
let worker = registry.create("/tmp/repo-mcp", &[], true);
let blocked = registry
.observe(
&worker.worker_id,
"Allow the omx_memory MCP server to run tool \"project_memory_read\"?\n\
1. Yes, allow once\n\
2. Always allow this tool",
)
.expect("tool permission observe should succeed");
assert_eq!(blocked.status, WorkerStatus::ToolPermissionRequired);
assert_eq!(
blocked
.last_error
.as_ref()
.expect("tool permission error should exist")
.kind,
WorkerFailureKind::ToolPermissionGate
);
let event = blocked
.events
.iter()
.find(|event| event.kind == WorkerEventKind::ToolPermissionRequired)
.expect("tool permission event should exist");
assert_eq!(
event.payload,
Some(WorkerEventPayload::ToolPermissionPrompt {
server_name: Some("omx_memory".to_string()),
tool_name: Some("project_memory_read".to_string()),
prompt_age_seconds: 0,
allow_scope: ToolPermissionAllowScope::SessionOrAlways,
prompt_preview: prompt_preview(
"Allow the omx_memory MCP server to run tool \"project_memory_read\"?",
),
})
);
let readiness = registry
.await_ready(&worker.worker_id)
.expect("ready snapshot should load");
assert!(readiness.blocked);
assert!(!readiness.ready);
}
#[test]
fn startup_timeout_classifies_tool_permission_prompt() {
let registry = WorkerRegistry::new();
let worker = registry.create("/tmp/repo-mcp-timeout", &[], true);
registry
.observe(
&worker.worker_id,
"Allow the omx_memory MCP server to run tool \"notepad_read\"?\n\
1. Yes, allow once",
)
.expect("tool permission observe should succeed");
let timed_out = registry
.observe_startup_timeout(&worker.worker_id, "claw prompt", true, true)
.expect("startup timeout observe should succeed");
let event = timed_out
.events
.iter()
.find(|event| event.kind == WorkerEventKind::StartupNoEvidence)
.expect("startup no evidence event should exist");
match event.payload.as_ref() {
Some(WorkerEventPayload::StartupNoEvidence {
classification,
evidence,
}) => {
assert_eq!(
*classification,
StartupFailureClassification::ToolPermissionRequired
);
assert!(evidence.tool_permission_prompt_detected);
assert_eq!(
evidence.tool_permission_allow_scope,
Some(ToolPermissionAllowScope::SessionOnly)
);
assert!(evidence.tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds.is_some());
}
_ => panic!("expected StartupNoEvidence payload"),
}
}
#[test]
fn prompt_misdelivery_is_detected_and_replay_can_be_rearmed() {
let registry = WorkerRegistry::new();
@@ -1940,9 +1634,6 @@ mod tests {
prompt_sent_at: Some(1_234_567_890),
prompt_acceptance_state: false,
trust_prompt_detected: true,
tool_permission_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: None,
tool_permission_allow_scope: None,
transport_healthy: true,
mcp_healthy: false,
elapsed_seconds: 60,
@@ -1970,9 +1661,6 @@ mod tests {
prompt_sent_at: None,
prompt_acceptance_state: false,
trust_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: None,
tool_permission_allow_scope: None,
transport_healthy: false,
mcp_healthy: true,
elapsed_seconds: 30,
@@ -1990,9 +1678,6 @@ mod tests {
prompt_sent_at: None,
prompt_acceptance_state: false,
trust_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: None,
tool_permission_allow_scope: None,
transport_healthy: true,
mcp_healthy: true,
elapsed_seconds: 10,
@@ -2012,9 +1697,6 @@ mod tests {
prompt_sent_at: None, // No prompt sent yet
prompt_acceptance_state: false,
trust_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_detected: false,
tool_permission_prompt_age_seconds: None,
tool_permission_allow_scope: None,
transport_healthy: true,
mcp_healthy: false, // MCP unhealthy but transport healthy suggests crash
elapsed_seconds: 45,

View File

@@ -374,13 +374,11 @@ fn run() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
model_flag_raw,
permission_mode,
output_format,
allowed_tools,
} => print_status_snapshot(
&model,
model_flag_raw.as_deref(),
permission_mode,
output_format,
allowed_tools.as_ref(),
)?,
CliAction::Sandbox { output_format } => print_sandbox_status_snapshot(output_format)?,
CliAction::Prompt {
@@ -517,7 +515,6 @@ enum CliAction {
model_flag_raw: Option<String>,
permission_mode: PermissionMode,
output_format: CliOutputFormat,
allowed_tools: Option<AllowedToolSet>,
},
Sandbox {
output_format: CliOutputFormat,
@@ -852,7 +849,6 @@ fn parse_args(args: &[String]) -> Result<CliAction, String> {
model_flag_raw.as_deref(),
permission_mode_override,
output_format,
allowed_tools.clone(),
) {
return action;
}
@@ -1058,7 +1054,6 @@ fn parse_single_word_command_alias(
model_flag_raw: Option<&str>,
permission_mode_override: Option<PermissionMode>,
output_format: CliOutputFormat,
allowed_tools: Option<AllowedToolSet>,
) -> Option<Result<CliAction, String>> {
if rest.is_empty() {
return None;
@@ -1103,7 +1098,6 @@ fn parse_single_word_command_alias(
model_flag_raw: model_flag_raw.map(str::to_string), // #148
permission_mode: permission_mode_override.unwrap_or_else(default_permission_mode),
output_format,
allowed_tools,
})),
"sandbox" => Some(Ok(CliAction::Sandbox { output_format })),
"doctor" => Some(Ok(CliAction::Doctor { output_format })),
@@ -1961,7 +1955,6 @@ fn render_doctor_report() -> Result<DoctorReport, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
project_root,
git_branch,
git_summary,
session_lifecycle: classify_session_lifecycle_for(&cwd),
sandbox_status: resolve_sandbox_status(sandbox_config.sandbox(), &cwd),
// Doctor path has its own config check; StatusContext here is only
// fed into health renderers that don't read config_load_error.
@@ -2806,7 +2799,6 @@ struct StatusContext {
project_root: Option<PathBuf>,
git_branch: Option<String>,
git_summary: GitWorkspaceSummary,
session_lifecycle: SessionLifecycleSummary,
sandbox_status: runtime::SandboxStatus,
/// #143: when `.claw.json` (or another loaded config file) fails to parse,
/// we capture the parse error here and still populate every field that
@@ -2836,75 +2828,6 @@ struct GitWorkspaceSummary {
conflicted_files: usize,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum SessionLifecycleKind {
RunningProcess,
IdleShell,
SavedOnly,
}
impl SessionLifecycleKind {
fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::RunningProcess => "running_process",
Self::IdleShell => "idle_shell",
Self::SavedOnly => "saved_only",
}
}
fn human_label(self) -> &'static str {
match self {
Self::RunningProcess => "running process",
Self::IdleShell => "idle shell",
Self::SavedOnly => "saved only",
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind,
pane_id: Option<String>,
pane_command: Option<String>,
pane_path: Option<PathBuf>,
workspace_dirty: bool,
abandoned: bool,
}
impl SessionLifecycleSummary {
fn signal(&self) -> String {
let mut parts = vec![self.kind.human_label().to_string()];
if self.workspace_dirty {
parts.push("dirty worktree".to_string());
}
if self.abandoned {
parts.push("abandoned?".to_string());
}
if let Some(command) = self.pane_command.as_deref() {
parts.push(format!("cmd={command}"));
}
parts.join(" · ")
}
fn json_value(&self) -> serde_json::Value {
json!({
"kind": self.kind.as_str(),
"pane_id": self.pane_id,
"pane_command": self.pane_command,
"pane_path": self.pane_path.as_ref().map(|path| path.display().to_string()),
"workspace_dirty": self.workspace_dirty,
"abandoned": self.abandoned,
})
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
struct TmuxPaneSnapshot {
pane_id: String,
current_command: String,
current_path: PathBuf,
}
impl GitWorkspaceSummary {
fn is_clean(self) -> bool {
self.changed_files == 0
@@ -2936,120 +2859,6 @@ impl GitWorkspaceSummary {
}
}
fn classify_session_lifecycle_for(workspace: &Path) -> SessionLifecycleSummary {
classify_session_lifecycle_from_panes(workspace, discover_tmux_panes())
}
fn classify_session_lifecycle_from_panes(
workspace: &Path,
panes: Vec<TmuxPaneSnapshot>,
) -> SessionLifecycleSummary {
let workspace_dirty = git_worktree_is_dirty(workspace);
let mut idle_shell = None;
for pane in panes {
if !pane_path_matches_workspace(&pane.current_path, workspace) {
continue;
}
if is_idle_shell_command(&pane.current_command) {
idle_shell.get_or_insert(pane);
} else {
return SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind::RunningProcess,
pane_id: Some(pane.pane_id),
pane_command: Some(pane.current_command),
pane_path: Some(pane.current_path),
workspace_dirty,
abandoned: false,
};
}
}
if let Some(pane) = idle_shell {
SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind::IdleShell,
pane_id: Some(pane.pane_id),
pane_command: Some(pane.current_command),
pane_path: Some(pane.current_path),
workspace_dirty,
abandoned: workspace_dirty,
}
} else {
SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind::SavedOnly,
pane_id: None,
pane_command: None,
pane_path: None,
workspace_dirty,
abandoned: workspace_dirty,
}
}
}
fn discover_tmux_panes() -> Vec<TmuxPaneSnapshot> {
let output = Command::new("tmux")
.args([
"list-panes",
"-a",
"-F",
"#{pane_id}\t#{pane_current_command}\t#{pane_current_path}",
])
.output();
let Ok(output) = output else {
return Vec::new();
};
if !output.status.success() {
return Vec::new();
}
let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);
parse_tmux_pane_snapshots(&stdout)
}
fn parse_tmux_pane_snapshots(output: &str) -> Vec<TmuxPaneSnapshot> {
output
.lines()
.filter_map(|line| {
let mut fields = line.splitn(3, '\t');
let pane_id = fields.next()?.trim();
let current_command = fields.next()?.trim();
let current_path = fields.next()?.trim();
if pane_id.is_empty() || current_path.is_empty() {
return None;
}
Some(TmuxPaneSnapshot {
pane_id: pane_id.to_string(),
current_command: current_command.to_string(),
current_path: PathBuf::from(current_path),
})
})
.collect()
}
fn pane_path_matches_workspace(pane_path: &Path, workspace: &Path) -> bool {
let pane_path = fs::canonicalize(pane_path).unwrap_or_else(|_| pane_path.to_path_buf());
let workspace = fs::canonicalize(workspace).unwrap_or_else(|_| workspace.to_path_buf());
pane_path == workspace || pane_path.starts_with(&workspace)
}
fn is_idle_shell_command(command: &str) -> bool {
let command = command.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(command);
matches!(
command,
"bash" | "zsh" | "sh" | "fish" | "nu" | "pwsh" | "powershell" | "cmd"
)
}
fn git_worktree_is_dirty(workspace: &Path) -> bool {
let output = Command::new("git")
.arg("-C")
.arg(workspace)
.args(["status", "--porcelain"])
.output();
output
.ok()
.filter(|output| output.status.success())
.is_some_and(|output| !output.stdout.is_empty())
}
#[cfg(test)]
fn format_unknown_slash_command_message(name: &str) -> String {
let suggestions = suggest_slash_commands(name);
@@ -3415,7 +3224,6 @@ fn run_resume_command(
default_permission_mode().as_str(),
&context,
None, // #148: resumed sessions don't have flag provenance
None,
)),
})
}
@@ -3592,18 +3400,6 @@ fn run_resume_command(
} if act == "list" => {
let sessions = list_managed_sessions().unwrap_or_default();
let session_ids: Vec<String> = sessions.iter().map(|s| s.id.clone()).collect();
let session_details: Vec<serde_json::Value> = sessions
.iter()
.map(|session| {
serde_json::json!({
"id": session.id,
"path": session.path.display().to_string(),
"message_count": session.message_count,
"updated_at_ms": session.updated_at_ms,
"lifecycle": session.lifecycle.json_value(),
})
})
.collect();
let active_id = session.session_id.clone();
let text = render_session_list(&active_id).unwrap_or_else(|e| format!("error: {e}"));
Ok(ResumeCommandOutcome {
@@ -3612,7 +3408,6 @@ fn run_resume_command(
json: Some(serde_json::json!({
"kind": "session_list",
"sessions": session_ids,
"session_details": session_details,
"active": active_id,
})),
})
@@ -3844,7 +3639,6 @@ struct ManagedSessionSummary {
message_count: usize,
parent_session_id: Option<String>,
branch_name: Option<String>,
lifecycle: SessionLifecycleSummary,
}
struct LiveCli {
@@ -5450,9 +5244,7 @@ fn resolve_managed_session_path(session_id: &str) -> Result<PathBuf, Box<dyn std
}
fn list_managed_sessions() -> Result<Vec<ManagedSessionSummary>, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let store = current_session_store()?;
let lifecycle = classify_session_lifecycle_for(store.workspace_root());
Ok(store
Ok(current_session_store()?
.list_sessions()
.map_err(|e| Box::new(e) as Box<dyn std::error::Error>)?
.into_iter()
@@ -5464,15 +5256,12 @@ fn list_managed_sessions() -> Result<Vec<ManagedSessionSummary>, Box<dyn std::er
message_count: session.message_count,
parent_session_id: session.parent_session_id,
branch_name: session.branch_name,
lifecycle: lifecycle.clone(),
})
.collect())
}
fn latest_managed_session() -> Result<ManagedSessionSummary, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let store = current_session_store()?;
let lifecycle = classify_session_lifecycle_for(store.workspace_root());
let session = store
let session = current_session_store()?
.latest_session()
.map_err(|e| Box::new(e) as Box<dyn std::error::Error>)?;
Ok(ManagedSessionSummary {
@@ -5483,7 +5272,6 @@ fn latest_managed_session() -> Result<ManagedSessionSummary, Box<dyn std::error:
message_count: session.message_count,
parent_session_id: session.parent_session_id,
branch_name: session.branch_name,
lifecycle,
})
}
@@ -5548,9 +5336,8 @@ fn render_session_list(active_session_id: &str) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::e
(None, None) => String::new(),
};
lines.push(format!(
" {id:<20} {marker:<10} lifecycle={lifecycle} msgs={msgs:<4} modified={modified}{lineage} path={path}",
" {id:<20} {marker:<10} msgs={msgs:<4} modified={modified}{lineage} path={path}",
id = session.id,
lifecycle = session.lifecycle.signal(),
msgs = session.message_count,
modified = format_session_modified_age(session.modified_epoch_millis),
lineage = lineage,
@@ -5627,7 +5414,6 @@ fn print_status_snapshot(
model_flag_raw: Option<&str>,
permission_mode: PermissionMode,
output_format: CliOutputFormat,
allowed_tools: Option<&AllowedToolSet>,
) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let usage = StatusUsage {
message_count: 0,
@@ -5667,7 +5453,6 @@ fn print_status_snapshot(
permission_mode.as_str(),
&context,
Some(&provenance),
allowed_tools,
))?
),
}
@@ -5685,7 +5470,6 @@ fn status_json_value(
// that don't have provenance (legacy resume paths) pass None, in which
// case both new fields are omitted.
provenance: Option<&ModelProvenance>,
allowed_tools: Option<&AllowedToolSet>,
) -> serde_json::Value {
// #143: top-level `status` marker so claws can distinguish
// a clean run from a degraded run (config parse failed but other fields
@@ -5695,7 +5479,6 @@ fn status_json_value(
let degraded = context.config_load_error.is_some();
let model_source = provenance.map(|p| p.source.as_str());
let model_raw = provenance.and_then(|p| p.raw.clone());
let allowed_tool_entries = allowed_tools.map(|tools| tools.iter().cloned().collect::<Vec<_>>());
json!({
"kind": "status",
"status": if degraded { "degraded" } else { "ok" },
@@ -5704,11 +5487,6 @@ fn status_json_value(
"model_source": model_source,
"model_raw": model_raw,
"permission_mode": permission_mode,
"allowed_tools": {
"source": if allowed_tools.is_some() { "flag" } else { "default" },
"restricted": allowed_tools.is_some(),
"entries": allowed_tool_entries,
},
"usage": {
"messages": usage.message_count,
"turns": usage.turns,
@@ -5733,7 +5511,6 @@ fn status_json_value(
// .claw/sessions/. Extract the stem (drop the .jsonl extension).
path.file_stem().map(|n| n.to_string_lossy().into_owned())
}),
"session_lifecycle": context.session_lifecycle.json_value(),
"loaded_config_files": context.loaded_config_files,
"discovered_config_files": context.discovered_config_files,
"memory_file_count": context.memory_file_count,
@@ -5789,7 +5566,7 @@ fn status_context(
parse_git_status_metadata(project_context.git_status.as_deref());
let git_summary = parse_git_workspace_summary(project_context.git_status.as_deref());
Ok(StatusContext {
cwd: cwd.clone(),
cwd,
session_path: session_path.map(Path::to_path_buf),
loaded_config_files,
discovered_config_files,
@@ -5797,7 +5574,6 @@ fn status_context(
project_root,
git_branch,
git_summary,
session_lifecycle: classify_session_lifecycle_for(&cwd),
sandbox_status,
config_load_error,
})
@@ -5871,7 +5647,6 @@ fn format_status_report(
Unstaged {}
Untracked {}
Session {}
Lifecycle {}
Config files loaded {}/{}
Memory files {}
Suggested flow /status → /diff → /commit",
@@ -5890,7 +5665,6 @@ fn format_status_report(
|| "live-repl".to_string(),
|path| path.display().to_string()
),
context.session_lifecycle.signal(),
context.loaded_config_files,
context.discovered_config_files,
context.memory_file_count,
@@ -6207,7 +5981,7 @@ fn render_config_report(section: Option<&str>) -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::er
}
fn render_config_json(
section: Option<&str>,
_section: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<serde_json::Value, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let cwd = env::current_dir()?;
let loader = ConfigLoader::default_for(&cwd);
@@ -6240,52 +6014,13 @@ fn render_config_json(
})
.collect();
let base = serde_json::json!({
Ok(serde_json::json!({
"kind": "config",
"cwd": cwd.display().to_string(),
"loaded_files": loaded_paths.len(),
"merged_keys": runtime_config.merged().len(),
"files": files,
});
if let Some(section) = section {
let section_rendered: Option<String> = match section {
"env" => runtime_config.get("env").map(|v| v.render()),
"hooks" => runtime_config.get("hooks").map(|v| v.render()),
"model" => runtime_config.get("model").map(|v| v.render()),
"plugins" => runtime_config
.get("plugins")
.or_else(|| runtime_config.get("enabledPlugins"))
.map(|v| v.render()),
other => {
return Ok(serde_json::json!({
"kind": "config",
"section": other,
"ok": false,
"error": format!("Unsupported config section '{other}'. Use env, hooks, model, or plugins."),
"cwd": cwd.display().to_string(),
"loaded_files": loaded_paths.len(),
"files": files,
}));
}
};
// Parse the rendered JSON string back into serde_json::Value so that
// section_value is a real JSON object/array in the envelope, not a quoted string.
let section_value: serde_json::Value = section_rendered
.as_deref()
.and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str(s).ok())
.unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
let mut obj = base;
let map = obj.as_object_mut().expect("base is object");
map.insert(
"section".to_string(),
serde_json::Value::String(section.to_string()),
);
map.insert("section_value".to_string(), section_value);
return Ok(obj);
}
Ok(base)
}))
}
fn render_memory_report() -> Result<String, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
@@ -9201,7 +8936,6 @@ fn print_help_to(out: &mut impl Write) -> io::Result<()> {
writeln!(out)?;
let resume_commands = resume_supported_slash_commands()
.into_iter()
.filter(|spec| !STUB_COMMANDS.contains(&spec.name))
.map(|spec| match spec.argument_hint {
Some(argument_hint) => format!("/{} {}", spec.name, argument_hint),
None => format!("/{}", spec.name),
@@ -9275,10 +9009,10 @@ fn print_help(output_format: CliOutputFormat) -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::
mod tests {
use super::{
build_runtime_plugin_state_with_loader, build_runtime_with_plugin_state,
classify_error_kind, classify_session_lifecycle_from_panes, collect_session_prompt_history,
create_managed_session_handle, describe_tool_progress, filter_tool_specs,
format_bughunter_report, format_commit_preflight_report, format_commit_skipped_report,
format_compact_report, format_connected_line, format_cost_report, format_history_timestamp,
classify_error_kind, collect_session_prompt_history, create_managed_session_handle,
describe_tool_progress, filter_tool_specs, format_bughunter_report,
format_commit_preflight_report, format_commit_skipped_report, format_compact_report,
format_connected_line, format_cost_report, format_history_timestamp,
format_internal_prompt_progress_line, format_issue_report, format_model_report,
format_model_switch_report, format_permissions_report, format_permissions_switch_report,
format_pr_report, format_resume_report, format_status_report, format_tool_call_start,
@@ -9289,15 +9023,14 @@ mod tests {
parse_history_count, permission_policy, print_help_to, push_output_block,
render_config_report, render_diff_report, render_diff_report_for, render_help_topic,
render_memory_report, render_prompt_history_report, render_repl_help, render_resume_usage,
render_session_list, render_session_markdown, resolve_model_alias,
resolve_model_alias_with_config, resolve_repl_model, resolve_session_reference,
response_to_events, resume_supported_slash_commands, run_resume_command, short_tool_id,
render_session_markdown, resolve_model_alias, resolve_model_alias_with_config,
resolve_repl_model, resolve_session_reference, response_to_events,
resume_supported_slash_commands, run_resume_command, short_tool_id,
slash_command_completion_candidates_with_sessions, split_error_hint, status_context,
status_json_value, summarize_tool_payload_for_markdown, try_resolve_bare_skill_prompt,
validate_no_args, write_mcp_server_fixture, CliAction, CliOutputFormat, CliToolExecutor,
GitWorkspaceSummary, InternalPromptProgressEvent, InternalPromptProgressState, LiveCli,
LocalHelpTopic, PromptHistoryEntry, SessionLifecycleKind, SessionLifecycleSummary,
SlashCommand, StatusUsage, TmuxPaneSnapshot, DEFAULT_MODEL, LATEST_SESSION_REFERENCE,
summarize_tool_payload_for_markdown, try_resolve_bare_skill_prompt, validate_no_args,
write_mcp_server_fixture, CliAction, CliOutputFormat, CliToolExecutor, GitWorkspaceSummary,
InternalPromptProgressEvent, InternalPromptProgressState, LiveCli, LocalHelpTopic,
PromptHistoryEntry, SlashCommand, StatusUsage, DEFAULT_MODEL, LATEST_SESSION_REFERENCE,
STUB_COMMANDS,
};
use api::{ApiError, MessageResponse, OutputContentBlock, Usage};
@@ -10075,18 +9808,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(error.contains("unsupported tool in --allowedTools: teleport"));
}
#[test]
fn rejects_empty_allowed_tools_flag() {
for raw in ["", ",,"] {
let error = parse_args(&["--allowedTools".to_string(), raw.to_string()])
.expect_err("empty allowedTools should be rejected");
assert!(
error.contains("--allowedTools was provided with no usable tool names"),
"unexpected error for {raw:?}: {error}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn parses_system_prompt_options() {
let args = vec![
@@ -10542,14 +10263,8 @@ mod tests {
cumulative: runtime::TokenUsage::default(),
estimated_tokens: 0,
};
let json = super::status_json_value(
Some("test-model"),
usage,
"workspace-write",
&context,
None,
None,
);
let json =
super::status_json_value(Some("test-model"), usage, "workspace-write", &context, None);
assert_eq!(
json.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
Some("degraded"),
@@ -10574,46 +10289,6 @@ mod tests {
json.get("sandbox").is_some(),
"sandbox field still reported"
);
assert_eq!(
json.pointer("/allowed_tools/source")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
Some("default"),
"default status should expose unrestricted tool source: {json}"
);
assert_eq!(
json.pointer("/allowed_tools/restricted")
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool()),
Some(false),
"default status should expose unrestricted tool state: {json}"
);
let allowed: super::AllowedToolSet = ["read_file", "grep_search"]
.into_iter()
.map(str::to_string)
.collect();
let restricted_json = super::status_json_value(
Some("test-model"),
usage,
"workspace-write",
&context,
None,
Some(&allowed),
);
assert_eq!(
restricted_json
.pointer("/allowed_tools/source")
.and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
Some("flag"),
"flag status should expose allow-list source: {restricted_json}"
);
assert_eq!(
restricted_json
.pointer("/allowed_tools/entries")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.map(Vec::len),
Some(2),
"flag status should expose allow-list entries: {restricted_json}"
);
// Clean path: no config error → status: "ok", config_load_error: null.
let clean_cwd = root.join("project-with-clean-config");
@@ -10628,7 +10303,6 @@ mod tests {
"workspace-write",
&clean_context,
None,
None,
);
assert_eq!(
clean_json.get("status").and_then(|v| v.as_str()),
@@ -10706,7 +10380,6 @@ mod tests {
model_flag_raw: None, // #148: no --model flag passed
permission_mode: PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess,
output_format: CliOutputFormat::Text,
allowed_tools: None,
}
);
assert_eq!(
@@ -11888,14 +11561,6 @@ mod tests {
untracked_files: 1,
conflicted_files: 0,
},
session_lifecycle: SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind::IdleShell,
pane_id: Some("%7".to_string()),
pane_command: Some("zsh".to_string()),
pane_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/project")),
workspace_dirty: true,
abandoned: true,
},
sandbox_status: runtime::SandboxStatus::default(),
config_load_error: None,
},
@@ -11918,149 +11583,11 @@ mod tests {
assert!(status.contains("Unstaged 1"));
assert!(status.contains("Untracked 1"));
assert!(status.contains("Session session.jsonl"));
assert!(
status.contains("Lifecycle idle shell · dirty worktree · abandoned? · cmd=zsh")
);
assert!(status.contains("Config files loaded 2/3"));
assert!(status.contains("Memory files 4"));
assert!(status.contains("Suggested flow /status → /diff → /commit"));
}
#[test]
fn session_lifecycle_prefers_running_process_over_idle_shell() {
let workspace = PathBuf::from("/tmp/project");
let lifecycle = classify_session_lifecycle_from_panes(
&workspace,
vec![
TmuxPaneSnapshot {
pane_id: "%1".to_string(),
current_command: "zsh".to_string(),
current_path: workspace.clone(),
},
TmuxPaneSnapshot {
pane_id: "%2".to_string(),
current_command: "claw".to_string(),
current_path: workspace.join("rust"),
},
],
);
assert_eq!(lifecycle.kind, SessionLifecycleKind::RunningProcess);
assert_eq!(lifecycle.pane_id.as_deref(), Some("%2"));
assert_eq!(lifecycle.pane_command.as_deref(), Some("claw"));
assert!(!lifecycle.abandoned);
}
#[test]
fn session_lifecycle_marks_dirty_idle_shell_as_abandoned() {
let _guard = env_lock();
let workspace = temp_workspace("dirty-idle-shell");
fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).expect("workspace should create");
git(&["init", "--quiet"], &workspace);
git(&["config", "user.email", "tests@example.com"], &workspace);
git(&["config", "user.name", "Rusty Claude Tests"], &workspace);
fs::write(workspace.join("tracked.txt"), "hello\n").expect("write tracked");
git(&["add", "tracked.txt"], &workspace);
git(&["commit", "-m", "init", "--quiet"], &workspace);
fs::write(workspace.join("tracked.txt"), "hello\nchanged\n").expect("dirty tracked");
let lifecycle = classify_session_lifecycle_from_panes(
&workspace,
vec![TmuxPaneSnapshot {
pane_id: "%3".to_string(),
current_command: "bash".to_string(),
current_path: workspace.clone(),
}],
);
assert_eq!(lifecycle.kind, SessionLifecycleKind::IdleShell);
assert!(lifecycle.workspace_dirty);
assert!(lifecycle.abandoned);
fs::remove_dir_all(workspace).expect("cleanup temp dir");
}
#[test]
fn session_list_surfaces_saved_dirty_abandoned_lifecycle() {
let _guard = cwd_guard();
let workspace = temp_workspace("session-list-lifecycle");
fs::create_dir_all(&workspace).expect("workspace should create");
git(&["init", "--quiet"], &workspace);
git(&["config", "user.email", "tests@example.com"], &workspace);
git(&["config", "user.name", "Rusty Claude Tests"], &workspace);
fs::write(workspace.join(".gitignore"), ".claw/\n").expect("write gitignore");
fs::write(workspace.join("tracked.txt"), "hello\n").expect("write tracked");
git(&["add", ".gitignore", "tracked.txt"], &workspace);
git(&["commit", "-m", "init", "--quiet"], &workspace);
let previous = std::env::current_dir().expect("cwd");
std::env::set_current_dir(&workspace).expect("switch cwd");
let handle = create_managed_session_handle("session-alpha").expect("session handle");
Session::new()
.with_workspace_root(workspace.clone())
.with_persistence_path(handle.path.clone())
.save_to_path(&handle.path)
.expect("session should save");
fs::write(workspace.join("tracked.txt"), "hello\nchanged\n").expect("dirty tracked");
let report = render_session_list("session-alpha").expect("session list should render");
assert!(report.contains("session-alpha"));
assert!(report.contains("lifecycle=saved only · dirty worktree · abandoned?"));
std::env::set_current_dir(previous).expect("restore cwd");
fs::remove_dir_all(workspace).expect("cleanup temp dir");
}
#[test]
fn status_json_surfaces_session_lifecycle_for_clawhip() {
let context = super::StatusContext {
cwd: PathBuf::from("/tmp/project"),
session_path: None,
loaded_config_files: 0,
discovered_config_files: 0,
memory_file_count: 0,
project_root: Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/project")),
git_branch: Some("feature/session-lifecycle".to_string()),
git_summary: GitWorkspaceSummary::default(),
session_lifecycle: SessionLifecycleSummary {
kind: SessionLifecycleKind::RunningProcess,
pane_id: Some("%9".to_string()),
pane_command: Some("claw".to_string()),
pane_path: Some(PathBuf::from("/tmp/project")),
workspace_dirty: false,
abandoned: false,
},
sandbox_status: runtime::SandboxStatus::default(),
config_load_error: None,
};
let value = status_json_value(
Some("claude-sonnet"),
StatusUsage {
message_count: 0,
turns: 0,
latest: runtime::TokenUsage::default(),
cumulative: runtime::TokenUsage::default(),
estimated_tokens: 0,
},
"workspace-write",
&context,
None,
None,
);
assert_eq!(
value["workspace"]["session_lifecycle"]["kind"],
"running_process"
);
assert_eq!(
value["workspace"]["session_lifecycle"]["pane_command"],
"claw"
);
assert_eq!(value["workspace"]["session_lifecycle"]["abandoned"], false);
}
#[test]
fn commit_reports_surface_workspace_context() {
let summary = GitWorkspaceSummary {
@@ -13397,32 +12924,6 @@ UU conflicted.rs",
);
}
}
#[test]
fn stub_commands_absent_from_resume_safe_help() {
let mut help = Vec::new();
print_help_to(&mut help).expect("help should render");
let help = String::from_utf8(help).expect("help should be utf8");
let resume_line = help
.lines()
.find(|line| line.starts_with("Resume-safe commands:"))
.expect("resume-safe command line should exist");
let resume_roots = resume_line
.trim_start_matches("Resume-safe commands:")
.split(',')
.filter_map(|entry| entry.trim().strip_prefix('/'))
.filter_map(|entry| entry.split_whitespace().next())
.collect::<Vec<_>>();
for stub in STUB_COMMANDS {
assert!(
!resume_roots.contains(stub),
"stub command /{stub} should not appear in resume-safe command list"
);
}
assert!(resume_roots.contains(&"status"));
}
}
fn write_mcp_server_fixture(script_path: &Path) {

View File

@@ -105,18 +105,6 @@ fn inventory_commands_emit_structured_json_when_requested() {
let skills = assert_json_command(&root, &["--output-format", "json", "skills"]);
assert_eq!(skills["kind"], "skills");
assert_eq!(skills["action"], "list");
let plugins = assert_json_command(&root, &["--output-format", "json", "plugins"]);
assert_eq!(plugins["kind"], "plugin");
assert_eq!(plugins["action"], "list");
assert!(
plugins["reload_runtime"].is_boolean(),
"plugins reload_runtime should be a boolean"
);
assert!(
plugins["target"].is_null(),
"plugins target should be null when no plugin is targeted"
);
}
#[test]
@@ -396,44 +384,6 @@ fn resumed_version_and_init_emit_structured_json_when_requested() {
assert!(root.join("CLAUDE.md").exists());
}
#[test]
fn config_section_json_emits_section_and_value() {
let root = unique_temp_dir("config-section-json");
fs::create_dir_all(&root).expect("temp dir should exist");
// Without a section: should return base envelope (no section field).
let base = assert_json_command(&root, &["--output-format", "json", "config"]);
assert_eq!(base["kind"], "config");
assert!(base["loaded_files"].is_number());
assert!(base["merged_keys"].is_number());
assert!(
base.get("section").is_none(),
"no section field without section arg"
);
// With a known section: should add section + section_value fields.
for section in &["model", "env", "hooks", "plugins"] {
let result = assert_json_command(&root, &["--output-format", "json", "config", section]);
assert_eq!(result["kind"], "config", "section={section}");
assert_eq!(
result["section"].as_str(),
Some(*section),
"section field must match requested section, got {result:?}"
);
assert!(
result.get("section_value").is_some(),
"section_value field must be present for section={section}"
);
}
// With an unsupported section: should return ok:false + error field.
let bad = assert_json_command(&root, &["--output-format", "json", "config", "unknown"]);
assert_eq!(bad["kind"], "config");
assert_eq!(bad["ok"], false);
assert!(bad["error"].as_str().is_some());
assert!(bad["section"].as_str().is_some());
}
fn assert_json_command(current_dir: &Path, args: &[&str]) -> Value {
assert_json_command_with_env(current_dir, args, &[])
}

View File

@@ -240,13 +240,6 @@ impl GlobalToolRegistry {
}
}
if allowed.is_empty() {
return Err(format!(
"--allowedTools was provided with no usable tool names (got `{}`). Omit the flag to allow all tools.",
values.join(" ")
));
}
Ok(Some(allowed))
}
@@ -6890,21 +6883,6 @@ mod tests {
assert!(empty_permission.contains("unsupported plugin permission: "));
}
#[test]
fn allowed_tools_rejects_empty_token_lists() {
let registry = GlobalToolRegistry::builtin();
for raw in ["", ",,", " "] {
let err = registry
.normalize_allowed_tools(&[raw.to_string()])
.expect_err("empty allow-list input should be rejected");
assert!(
err.contains("--allowedTools was provided with no usable tool names"),
"unexpected error for {raw:?}: {err}"
);
}
}
#[test]
fn runtime_tools_extend_registry_definitions_permissions_and_search() {
let registry = GlobalToolRegistry::builtin()

View File

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
REPO_ROOT="$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)"
cd "$REPO_ROOT/rust"
exec cargo fmt "$@"