docs(roadmap): add #444 — no broad-cwd guard for --resume; ROOT/HOME silently writable

Pinpoint: claw --resume latest from / hits 'Read-only file system'
(OS error 30) — only saved by root being read-only. From /tmp or
$HOME, silently creates .claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/ droppings.
Exit code 0 on the read-only-FS error. Stale /tmp/.claw from 13:31
dogfood still present at 21:30 (10 hours, 6+ HEADs later) — #435's
deferred-creation fix hasn't landed. The broad-cwd guard only covers
shorthand prompt path, not resume/status/doctor.

ROADMAP.md

@@ -6407,3 +6407,6 @@ Original filing (2026-04-18): the session emitted `SessionStart hook (completed)
 
 443. **`claw acp serve` exits 0 with `status:"discoverability_only", supported:false` instead of failing — automation pipelines see "success" from a command that explicitly says "not implemented"; ROADMAP #413's internal-tracking leak (`discoverability_tracking:"ROADMAP #64a"`, `tracking:"ROADMAP #76"`) still present despite being filed 2026-04-30** — dogfooded 2026-05-11 by Jobdori on `19aaf9d0` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1503366101533200435`. Reproduction: `claw acp serve --output-format json` returns exit code **0** with envelope `{aliases:["acp","--acp","-acp"], discoverability_tracking:"ROADMAP #64a", kind:"acp", launch_command:null, message:"ACP/Zed editor integration is not implemented in claw-code yet. \`claw acp serve\` is only a discoverability alias today; it does not launch a daemon or Zed-specific protocol endpoint. Use the normal terminal surfaces for now and track ROADMAP #76 for real ACP support.", recommended_workflows:["claw prompt TEXT","claw","claw doctor"], serve_alias_only:true, status:"discoverability_only", supported:false, tracking:"ROADMAP #76"}`. The exit code is 0 (success) but the command explicitly states it is not implemented. Pipeline like `claw acp serve && zed --connect localhost:12345` will proceed to the zed connect step despite `acp serve` being a no-op. The only signal of no-op is `supported:false` in the JSON body — easy to miss for automation gating on `$?`. **ROADMAP #413 reproduction confirmed unfixed:** #413 (filed 2026-04-30) called out `discoverability_tracking:"ROADMAP #64a"` and `tracking:"ROADMAP #76"` as internal ticket references leaked into public JSON. **11 days later, both fields are still present in the envelope.** The fix was prescribed but never landed. Also `recommended_workflows:["claw prompt TEXT","claw","claw doctor"]` is internal scaffolding (curated suggestion list) exposed as a top-level public field — not normally part of an "ACP status" public contract. **Sibling unknown-subcommand bug:** `claw acp status --output-format json` (a reasonable next-thing-to-try) returns `{"error":"unsupported ACP invocation. Use \`claw acp\`, \`claw acp serve\`, \`claw --acp\`, or \`claw -acp\`.","kind":"unknown"}` exit 0 — the `kind:"unknown"` catch-all yet again (#422/#423/#424/#428/#430/#431/#432/#433/#435/#440/#441/#442 — **14th occurrence**), should be `kind:"unsupported_acp_invocation"`. **Required fix shape:** (a) `claw acp serve` exits **non-zero** (exit code 2 = "not implemented" is conventional) so automation `$?`-gating detects the no-op; (b) deliver #413's fix: remove `discoverability_tracking` and `tracking` top-level fields, OR move them under an optional `_meta` sub-object gated on a debug flag; (c) replace `message` prose with a typed `reason:"not_implemented"` enum + optional `detail` string for downstream pipelines that need a stable signal; (d) drop `recommended_workflows` from the ACP envelope OR move it under `_meta`; (e) the `status:"discoverability_only"` value is non-standard — replace with `status:"not_implemented"` (matching the `supported:false` boolean); (f) typed `kind:"unsupported_acp_invocation"` for the bad-arg path. **Why this matters:** ACP/Zed integration is the integration point for IDE-based AI workflows. A "success" exit code on a "not implemented" stub breaks the contract for any wrapper script that tries to detect ACP availability via `claw acp serve && ...`. The internal-tracking-ID leak (#413) being unfixed for 11 days suggests the JSON envelope audit isn't being executed against the ROADMAP backlog. Cross-references #413 (internal tracking leak — unfixed), #422 (exit-code parity), `kind:"unknown"` catch-all cluster. Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `19aaf9d0`, 2026-05-11.
 
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+444. **No broad-cwd safety guard for `--resume` — `claw --resume latest` from `/` attempts to `mkdir /.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` and is only stopped by the read-only filesystem at root; from any writable system directory (`/tmp`, `/var/tmp`, `$HOME` itself) it silently creates `.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` droppings; exit code is 0 (success) on the read-only filesystem error path** — dogfooded 2026-05-11 by Jobdori on `b2048856` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1503373639884607629`. Reproduction: `cd / && claw --resume latest --output-format json` returns `{"error":"failed to restore session: Read-only file system (os error 30)","hint":null,"kind":"session_load_failed","type":"error"}` exit **0**. The OS permission denial is the only thing preventing claw from creating `/.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` in the root filesystem. Compare with `cd /tmp && claw --resume latest --output-format json`: silently creates `/tmp/.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` partition (confirmed by `ls /tmp/.claw` showing a directory from a prior dogfood session at `13:31` — the May 11 11:00 pinpoint #435 dropping is still there 10+ hours later, despite documented cleanup). Same dogfood session: `cd $HOME && claw --resume latest` would silently create `~/.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` (the user's home claw config dir). The shorthand prompt path has a broad-cwd guard (`claw is running from a very broad directory (/). The agent can read and search everything under this path. Use --allow-broad-cwd to proceed anyway`) — but the guard does NOT fire on `--resume`, `--status`, or `claw status` invocations. Inconsistent safety surface: the dangerous path (LLM prompt with full tool access) has a guard, but session-management paths that create filesystem artifacts in broad locations have none. **Three sibling findings in same probe:** (a) **exit-code 0 on filesystem error** (`session_load_failed` envelope returns exit code 0): the read-only-filesystem error from `/.claw` creation path is an unrecoverable failure but the process exits 0 — same exit-parity bug as #422/#435; (b) **stale filesystem droppings**: `/tmp/.claw/` from a 13:31 dogfood session at HEAD `6c0c305a` is still present at 21:30 (10 hours later, 6+ HEADs later). The "deferred cleanup" or "lazy creation" fix prescribed in #435 hasn't landed; (c) **broad-cwd guard misfires on resume**: the existing guard from `run` path (visible in `claw --help` as "Use --allow-broad-cwd to proceed anyway") never fires on `--resume`. Either both paths should guard, or the guard should be promoted to a global pre-check. **Required fix shape:** (a) extend the broad-cwd guard to `--resume`, `claw status`, `claw doctor`, and every command that may create filesystem artifacts; `cd / && claw --resume latest` must fail fast with `kind:"broad_cwd_blocked"` before any filesystem operation; (b) `cd $HOME && claw` should warn that the workspace is your home directory and ask for `--allow-broad-cwd` (the LLM with full filesystem access in `$HOME` is the same blast radius as in `/`); (c) exit code 1 for `session_load_failed` regardless of underlying cause; (d) deliver #435's "defer fingerprint directory creation to first successful save" fix — failed `--resume` must not leave filesystem droppings; (e) cleanup `/tmp/.claw/` style scratch-dir artifacts via a `claw doctor --cleanup` or similar opt-in mechanism; (f) regression test: failed `--resume` does not create any directories under cwd. **Why this matters:** users running claw as part of CI/cron from system directories silently accumulate `.claw/sessions/<fingerprint>/` artifacts in /tmp, /var, /opt, $HOME, etc. Running as root from / would (with a writable root) silently pollute the root filesystem. The broad-cwd guard exists but only covers one entry point. Cross-references #427 (broad-cwd guard fires on resume too — actually it doesn't, that note in #427 was inaccurate), #428 (default permission_mode danger-full-access — compounds with this: full access + no broad-cwd guard = serious blast radius), #435 (filesystem side effects on failed resume), #422 (exit-code parity). Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `b2048856`, 2026-05-11.
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