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docs(roadmap): add g004 suffix path validation gap

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Yeachan-Heo
2026-05-22 00:01:11 +00:00
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@@ -6679,3 +6679,5 @@ Original filing (2026-04-18): the session emitted `SessionStart hook (completed)
561. **Branch-lock collision detection treats module strings literally, so equivalent paths with `./`, duplicate slashes, or trailing slashes evade same-branch overlap detection** — dogfooded 2026-05-21 from the `#clawcode-building-in-public` 23:00 UTC nudge on `/home/bellman/Workspace/claw-code-pr2967` with branch/origin `docs/roadmap-workdir-provenance@f45b651` and binary built from source SHA `25d663d`. Active tmux session at probe time: `gajae-issue-316-inflight-review-superseded-merge`. Code inspection: `detect_branch_lock_collisions` in `runtime/src/branch_lock.rs:23-49` delegates to `overlapping_modules`, which compares raw `modules: Vec<String>` entries via `modules_overlap` at `branch_lock.rs:65-69`: exact equality or prefix with `format!("{right}/")` / `format!("{left}/")`. No normalization is applied. As a result, two lanes on the same branch with semantically identical module scopes like `runtime/mcp` vs `./runtime/mcp`, `runtime/mcp` vs `runtime/mcp/`, `runtime//mcp` vs `runtime/mcp`, or `crates/runtime/../runtime/mcp` are not detected as collisions, even though they target the same files. The existing tests cover exact same module, nested raw-prefix module, and different branches only; they do not exercise path normalization or malformed-but-common module inputs. This is distinct from Jobdori's #562 empty-modules whole-branch gap: even non-empty module locks can bypass collision checks when strings differ syntactically. **Required fix shape:** (a) normalize module scopes before comparison by trimming whitespace, removing leading `./`, collapsing repeated slashes, dropping trailing slashes, and resolving `.`/`..` components without escaping repo root; (b) store/report both normalized collision scope and raw input modules for auditability; (c) reject or explicitly mark invalid module paths that normalize outside the repo; (d) add tests for `./runtime/mcp`, `runtime/mcp/`, `runtime//mcp`, nested normalized paths, and invalid `../` escape attempts; (e) keep deterministic sorted/deduped collision output after normalization. **Why this matters:** branch locks are a coordination safety rail. If two agents can claim the same branch/module by spelling the path differently, lock receipts give false confidence and concurrent lanes can still overwrite or review-stomp each other. Source: gaebal-gajae dogfood response to Clawhip message `1507156065941192705` on 2026-05-21.
562. **Approval tokens are still accepted at their exact expiry second because validation uses `now > expires_at` instead of `now >= expires_at`** — dogfooded 2026-05-21 from the `#clawcode-building-in-public` 23:30 UTC nudge on `/home/bellman/Workspace/claw-code-pr2967` with branch/origin `docs/roadmap-workdir-provenance@3d877d7` and binary built from source SHA `25d663d`. Active tmux session at probe time: `gajae-issue-317-inflight-review-restart`. Code inspection: `ApprovalTokenGrant::expires_at` stores `expires_at_epoch_seconds`, and `ApprovalTokenLedger::validate_grant` at `runtime/src/approval_tokens.rs:286-290` rejects only when `now_epoch_seconds > expires_at`. Therefore a token with `expires_at(20)` remains valid for verification/consumption when `now_epoch_seconds == 20`; it expires only at 21. The existing test `approval_token_rejects_scope_expansion_expiry_and_revocation` checks `ledger.verify(..., now=21)` for `expires_at(20)` but does not cover the boundary at exactly 20. This differs from the OAuth expiry helper in `api/src/providers/anthropic.rs`, which uses `expires_at <= now_unix_timestamp()` and treats the timestamp as no longer valid once reached. **Required fix shape:** (a) change approval-token expiry validation to `now_epoch_seconds >= expires_at` or explicitly rename/document the field as `valid_through_epoch_seconds` if inclusive semantics are intended; (b) add boundary tests for `now=expires_at-1`, `now=expires_at`, and `now=expires_at+1` for both `verify` and `consume`; (c) include `expires_at_epoch_seconds` and `now_epoch_seconds` in expiry audit/error metadata so operators can see boundary decisions; (d) align approval-token expiry semantics with OAuth/token-cache expiry conventions across the codebase; (e) add conformance coverage if approval tokens are exported in G004 bundles. **Why this matters:** approval tokens authorize policy exceptions. An off-by-one expiry window is small but security-sensitive and, without boundary tests, future short-lived approval grants can be consumed exactly at the moment operators expect them to be dead. Source: gaebal-gajae dogfood response to Clawhip message `1507163615596380191` on 2026-05-21.
563. **G004 conformance `get_path` falls back to suffix pointers, so nested required fields can be satisfied by same-named root fields and invalid bundles pass** — dogfooded 2026-05-22 from the `#clawcode-building-in-public` 00:00 UTC nudge on `/home/bellman/Workspace/claw-code-pr2967` with branch/origin `docs/roadmap-workdir-provenance@8ea54d3` and binary built from source SHA `25d663d`. Active tmux session at probe time: `gajae-issue-316-fix-still-open-fixture`. Code inspection: every conformance field helper ultimately calls `get_path(root, pointer)` in `runtime/src/g004_conformance.rs:386-398`. If `root.pointer(path)` misses, `get_path` iterates suffixes of the requested path and tries those against the same root object. For example, validating a report's `/identity/contentHash` at `g004_conformance.rs:132-137` first checks that nested field; if it is missing, `get_path(report, "/identity/contentHash")` then tries `"/contentHash"`. A malformed report with top-level `contentHash` but no `identity.contentHash` therefore passes the nested identity requirement. The same suffix fallback affects `/projection/provenance`, `/redaction/provenance`, `/metadata/provenance`, `/metadata/seq`, `/metadata/eventFingerprint`, and similar nested contract fields. This makes the machine-checkable G004 validator structurally permissive in exactly the fields that are supposed to prove provenance/identity, and tests/fixtures do not appear to include negative cases for misplaced nested fields. **Required fix shape:** (a) remove suffix fallback from `get_path` and use strict JSON Pointer lookup for conformance validation; (b) if fallback is needed for legacy aliases, make it explicit per field with a deprecation warning/error code, never implicit for all nested fields; (c) add negative tests where top-level `contentHash`, `provenance`, `seq`, or `eventFingerprint` exist but the required nested path is absent, proving validation fails; (d) update error messages to report the exact missing nested path; (e) run existing G004 fixtures through strict validation and fix any accidental reliance on suffix aliases. **Why this matters:** conformance validators are trust boundaries. A suffix fallback lets artifacts satisfy provenance/identity requirements from the wrong location, so downstream consumers can accept bundles whose shape does not match the advertised contract. Source: gaebal-gajae dogfood response to Clawhip message `1507171165033201735` on 2026-05-22.