mirror of
https://github.com/instructkr/claude-code.git
synced 2026-05-24 14:36:44 +00:00
Compare commits
1 Commits
docs/roadm
...
docs/roadm
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
|
66c6f8ec79 |
78
ROADMAP.md
78
ROADMAP.md
@@ -6429,62 +6429,38 @@ Original filing (2026-04-18): the session emitted `SessionStart hook (completed)
|
||||
|
||||
450. **`prompt` emits `kind:"missing_credentials"` JSON on STDERR (not stdout), leaving stdout at 0 bytes — automation pattern `output=$(claw prompt hello --output-format json)` captures nothing on auth-absent failure; `doctor` correctly surfaces `auth.status:"warn"` with `api_key_present:false` but exposes no `prompt_ready:false` field that automation can check before invoking `prompt`** — dogfooded 2026-05-16 by Jobdori on `a35ee9a0` in response to Clawhip pinpoint nudge at `1505208225321062521`. Exact reproduction (isolated env, no creds, fresh git repo, HEAD `a35ee9a0`): `timeout 5 env -i HOME=$ISOLATED_HOME PATH=$PATH CLAW_CONFIG_HOME=$PROBE/.claw-cfg claw prompt hello --output-format json > stdout.txt 2> stderr.txt` → stdout = **0 bytes**, stderr = 195 bytes containing `{"error":"missing Anthropic credentials…","exit_code":1,"hint":null,"kind":"missing_credentials","type":"error"}`, exit code 1. Confirms Gaebal's `1505208553793781792` pinpoint that `prompt` timeout + zero bytes was the prior state — HEAD `a35ee9a0` now correctly exits 1 with `kind:"missing_credentials"` **but the envelope is still routed to stderr** (issue #447 class, same class as prior entries #422, #435). **Contrast with `doctor`:** `claw doctor --output-format json 2>/dev/null` succeeds to stdout with `checks[auth].status:"warn"`, `api_key_present:false`, `auth_token_present:false` — but the auth check has no `prompt_ready:false` field. Automation that gates on `doctor` before invoking `prompt` must re-derive readiness from `api_key_present && auth_token_present` — there is no single canonical boolean. **Three compound problems:** (a) **stdout-empty on `--output-format json` failure**: same class as #447; `prompt`'s error envelope goes to stderr, not stdout. The canonical automation idiom `if ! result=$(claw prompt "q" --output-format json); then echo "$result" | jq .kind; fi` sees `$result=""` on failure — the jq call gets nothing. All `--output-format json` error paths must route JSON to stdout per #447 contract; (b) **`doctor` missing `prompt_ready` field**: `doctor --output-format json` already knows auth is absent (`api_key_present:false`) but surfaces no derived `prompt_ready:bool` or `prompt_blocked_reason:string` field. Automation must infer readiness from `api_key_present || auth_token_present || legacy_*_present` — a 5-field OR across legacy fields that is fragile as auth mechanisms evolve. A single `prompt_ready:false` (with `prompt_blocked_reason:"auth_missing"`) inside the `auth` check would give downstream a stable contract; (c) **`claw prompt` with no auth does no preflight and fires straight at the API**: the preflight check that `doctor` runs (auth discovery) is not reused by `prompt` to emit a fast typed error before attempting the network call. Both Gaebal's pinpoint (prompt hanging silently on older HEAD) and the current behavior (prompt hitting auth gate after a brief API attempt) stem from the same root: prompt does not short-circuit at the point where `doctor` already knows auth is absent. If `doctor` can emit `kind:"doctor"` with `auth.status:"warn"` in ~20ms without a network call, `prompt` should emit `kind:"missing_credentials"` in the same window and output it to stdout. **Required fix shape:** (a) `prompt --output-format json` must write the `kind:"missing_credentials"` JSON envelope to **stdout**, not stderr — same fix as #447 for all error envelopes; (b) add `prompt_ready:bool` and `prompt_blocked_reason:string|null` to the `auth` check in `doctor --output-format json`; derive it as `api_key_present || auth_token_present || legacy_saved_oauth_present`; (c) `prompt` must run the credential preflight check (same codepath as doctor's auth check) before attempting any API call and emit `{"kind":"missing_credentials","prompt_blocked_reason":"auth_missing"}` on **stdout** with exit 1 if the check fails; (d) `--output-format json` stdout routing fix must cover: `prompt`, `session list` (cross-ref #449), `skills uninstall` (cross-ref #431), `resume` (cross-ref #435), `acp serve` (cross-ref #443) — the full `kind:"missing_credentials"` class; (e) regression test: `claw prompt hello --output-format json` with no creds writes JSON to stdout (0 bytes stderr), exits 1, `kind:"missing_credentials"`, in under 200ms (no network attempt). **Why this matters:** `prompt` is the primary consumer entry point. Auth-absent failure routing to stderr breaks every automation wrapper that captures `$(claw prompt ... --output-format json)`. The `doctor` preflight metadata gap means auth-readiness checks require parsing 5 legacy fields instead of reading one boolean. Cross-references #447 (all JSON error envelopes on stderr), #449 (session list hits auth gate), #431 (skills uninstall hits auth gate), #357 (auth gate on local ops cluster), #422 (exit-code parity). Source: Jobdori live dogfood, `a35ee9a0`, 2026-05-16.
|
||||
|
||||
463. **Removed subcommands (`claw login`, `claw logout`) emit a hard-coded error sentinel that `classify_error_kind` then mis-buckets as `kind: "unknown"` instead of a typed `removed_subcommand` (or equivalent) kind, AND the `hint` field is `null` while the actual hint (`Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead`) is jammed into the same single-line `error` string — so a CI claw that branches on `kind` cannot distinguish "you typed a removed command" from "we have no idea what happened," and a claw that reads `hint` to suggest remediation gets `null` even though the remediation text exists verbatim in the same envelope** — dogfooded 2026-05-24 for the 13:30 Clawhip pinpoint nudge at message `1508099780230906027`, reproduced on local `./rust/target/debug/claw` `git_sha 003b739d` (origin/main `f8e1bb72`). Live envelope from clean isolated env (`HOME=/tmp/iso19/home`, fresh `/tmp/iso19/proj` git init):
|
||||
460. **`bare_slash_command_guidance` looks up the bare-verb argument against `slash_command_specs().iter().find(|spec| spec.name == command_name)` but never checks `spec.aliases`, so every documented slash-command alias — `skill` (alias of `/skills`), `marketplace` (alias of `/plugin`), `yes`/`y` (aliases of `/approve`), `no`/`n` (aliases of `/deny`), `cwd` (alias of `/workspace`), `plugins` (alias of `/plugin`) — fails the alias lookup and falls into either (a) the "Did you mean" typo path with nonsensical adjacent-prefix suggestions, or (b) the silent fallthrough to LLM Prompt dispatch that demands credentials and burns billable tokens. The canonical names (`skills`, `plugin`, `approve`, `deny`, `workspace`) correctly emit `"\`claw <verb>\` is a slash command. … run \`/<verb>\` inside the REPL."` guidance** — dogfooded 2026-05-24 for the 10:30 Clawhip pinpoint nudge at message `1508054486134947951`, reproduced on local `./rust/target/debug/claw` `git_sha 003b739d` (origin/main `f8e1bb72`). Triage matrix in clean isolated env (`HOME=/tmp/iso11/home`, fresh `/tmp/iso11/proj` git-init, `claw <verb> --output-format json </dev/null`):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
$ env -i HOME=/tmp/iso19/home PATH=/usr/bin:/bin TERM=dumb claw login --output-format json
|
||||
{"error":"`claw login` has been removed. Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead.","hint":null,"kind":"unknown","type":"error"}
|
||||
|
||||
$ env -i HOME=/tmp/iso19/home PATH=/usr/bin:/bin TERM=dumb claw logout --output-format json
|
||||
{"error":"`claw logout` has been removed. Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead.","hint":null,"kind":"unknown","type":"error"}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Cross-input comparison (the classifier triple-inconsistency):
|
||||
|
||||
| Input | exit | `kind` | `hint` | What actually happened |
|
||||
| Verb | Spec relationship | Expected | Actual | Bug class |
|
||||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `xyznotreal` (truly unknown) | 1 | `missing_credentials` | null | **Fell through to LLM-prompt path, billed-token risk** (covered by #108) |
|
||||
| `totally-fake-cmd` | 1 | `missing_credentials` | null | Same fallthrough as above |
|
||||
| `login` (removed) | 1 | **`unknown`** | **null** | Intercepted (good), wrong-kinded + hint discarded (this pinpoint) |
|
||||
| `logout` (removed) | 1 | **`unknown`** | **null** | Same as login |
|
||||
| `plugins` (formerly #78) | 0 | (works now) | — | Pre-grep confirmed #78 has been wired |
|
||||
| `skills` | spec name | `is a slash command. /skills` | ✅ correct | — |
|
||||
| `skill` | alias of `/skills` | `is a slash command. /skills` | ❌ `unknown subcommand. Did you mean skills` | wrong guidance class |
|
||||
| `plugin` | spec name | `is a slash command. /plugin` | ✅ correct | — |
|
||||
| `plugins` | alias of `/plugin` | `is a slash command. /plugin` | ✅ correct (CliAction::Status returned — `plugins` matches a DIFFERENT command branch first) | masked by other dispatch |
|
||||
| `marketplace` | alias of `/plugin` | `is a slash command. /plugin` | ❌ **`missing_credentials`** — billable token burn | silent LLM fallthrough |
|
||||
| `approve` | spec name | `is a slash command. /approve` | ✅ correct | — |
|
||||
| `yes` | alias of `/approve` | `is a slash command. /approve` | ❌ **`missing_credentials`** — billable token burn | silent LLM fallthrough |
|
||||
| `y` | alias of `/approve` | `is a slash command. /approve` | ❌ `unknown subcommand. Did you mean system-prompt` | nonsense suggestion |
|
||||
| `deny` | spec name | `is a slash command. /deny` | ✅ correct | — |
|
||||
| `no` | alias of `/deny` | `is a slash command. /deny` | ❌ **`missing_credentials`** — billable token burn | silent LLM fallthrough |
|
||||
| `n` | alias of `/deny` | `is a slash command. /deny` | ❌ `unknown subcommand. Did you mean init, agents, sandbox` | nonsense suggestion |
|
||||
| `workspace` | spec name | `is a slash command. /workspace` | ✅ correct | — |
|
||||
| `cwd` | alias of `/workspace` | `is a slash command. /workspace` | ❌ **`missing_credentials`** — billable token burn | silent LLM fallthrough |
|
||||
|
||||
**Root cause traced:** `rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/main.rs:951` returns the sentinel string from `removed_auth_surface_error()`:
|
||||
**Root cause (traced):** `rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/main.rs:1135-1137` (the entire alias-blind lookup):
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
"login" | "logout" => Err(removed_auth_surface_error(rest[0].as_str())),
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Where `removed_auth_surface_error` at `main.rs:1150-1154` is:
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
fn removed_auth_surface_error(command_name: &str) -> String {
|
||||
format!(
|
||||
"`claw {command_name}` has been removed. Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead."
|
||||
)
|
||||
fn bare_slash_command_guidance(command_name: &str) -> Option<String> {
|
||||
if matches!(command_name, "dump-manifests" | "bootstrap-plan" | "agents" | "mcp"
|
||||
| "skills" | "system-prompt" | "init" | "prompt" | "export") {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let slash_command = slash_command_specs()
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.find(|spec| spec.name == command_name)?; // ← only checks spec.name
|
||||
let guidance = if slash_command.resume_supported { … } else { … };
|
||||
Some(guidance)
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The single-line string then flows through `classify_error_kind` at `main.rs:253-286`:
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
fn classify_error_kind(message: &str) -> &'static str {
|
||||
if message.contains("missing Anthropic credentials") { "missing_credentials" }
|
||||
else if message.contains("Manifest source files are missing") { "missing_manifests" }
|
||||
// ... 11 more specific patterns ...
|
||||
else { "unknown" }
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The classifier has 13 explicit kinds; `has been removed` matches none → falls to `"unknown"`. And `split_error_hint` at `main.rs:290-295` splits on `\n` only — since the sentinel is one line, `hint` is always `None` even though everything after the first sentence IS the hint.
|
||||
|
||||
**Verification grep:** `grep -nE 'removed_subcommand|"removed"' rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/main.rs` returns zero hits. The only test coverage for the removed subcommands is `main.rs:11793-11794`:
|
||||
|
||||
```rust
|
||||
assert!(!help.contains("claw login"));
|
||||
assert!(!help.contains("claw logout"));
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Both assertions test `--help` text negative-presence only. No test asserts the error-envelope shape on actual `claw login` / `claw logout` invocation.
|
||||
|
||||
**Why distinct from existing items:** ROADMAP **#37** (DONE) covered the removal POLICY (Claude-subscription login flow taken out, OAuth fallback ignored, slash commands removed, docs updated). #37 explicitly does NOT discuss the *error envelope shape* of the sentinel — only that the surface is removed. ROADMAP **#108** covers truly-unknown subcommand typos falling through to LLM-prompt dispatch with `kind:missing_credentials` — different code path (`_other => CliAction::Prompt`), different misclassification, different fix. ROADMAP **#109** covers config-loader warnings flattened to stderr prose (loader-side prose-vs-structure gap). ROADMAP **#77** introduced `classify_error_kind` and `split_error_hint` (the very functions this entry pinpoints) — and added 13 specific kinds for THEN-existing error sentinels, but the `removed_auth_surface_error` sentinel added under #37 was never registered with the classifier #77 built. **None** of these existing entries address the specific "removed subcommand sentinel + classifier inconsistency + hint field discarded" triple. **Why this matters:** (1) **CI fingerprinting breakage.** A claw that runs `if claw $cmd --output-format json | jq -e '.kind == "unknown"'` to decide "unrecoverable, escalate to human" treats `claw login` typos identically to genuine internal errors — bad escalation triage. A claw that branches on `kind == "removed_subcommand"` for a graceful migration prompt has no way to distinguish today. (2) **Hint field discarded** is the same anti-pattern as `build_date` (#462), `memory_files[]` (#459), `missing_credentials.hint` (#455), `init.artifacts[]` (#79), `status.panes[]` (#326), `version.build_date` (#462). The structured field exists, the data exists, the wiring is one line, the envelope drops it. (3) **Classifier completeness debt.** The `classify_error_kind` function is the authoritative `kind` taxonomy. Every new error sentinel added anywhere in the codebase must register here or fall to `"unknown"`. There is no compile-time check enforcing this. A grep against new `Err(format!(...))` and `Err("...".into())` sites would surface the gap. **#37 + #77 is the first known instance of the orphan-sentinel pattern;** the same drift likely affects newer sentinels too (e.g., ACP unsupported invocation, MCP unsupported config-key, etc. — none verified yet, but worth a sweep). (4) **Asymmetric remediation guidance.** The error string DOES contain the remediation. A human reading prose sees it. A machine reading the dedicated `hint` field gets `null`. The information exists; the envelope just discards it. **Required fix shape:** (a) **Introduce structured sentinel emission for removed subcommands.** Replace `Err(removed_auth_surface_error(...))` at `main.rs:951` with a typed error variant carrying `kind: RemovedSubcommand { name, replacement_env_vars: Vec<&str> }` so the JSON layer can serialize a structured `{"kind": "removed_subcommand", "subcommand": "login", "replacement": "Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead.", "hint": "Set ANTHROPIC_API_KEY or ANTHROPIC_AUTH_TOKEN instead.", ...}` envelope without relying on string-contains classification. (b) **Add `"removed_subcommand"` to `classify_error_kind` taxonomy** as a defensive fallback for any other code path that may surface the sentinel as a String; key on `"has been removed"` substring. (c) **Make `removed_auth_surface_error` emit a two-line string** with the actionable advice on line 2 so `split_error_hint` populates `hint` non-null even on the string-only path. (d) **Add envelope-shape regression tests:** `output_format_contract.rs` should assert `claw login --output-format json` produces `{"kind": "removed_subcommand", "hint": <non-null string>, ...}` and `claw logout --output-format json` mirrors it; current asserts only test `--help` text. (e) **Sweep for other orphan sentinels.** Run `grep -rnE 'Err\(format!|Err\("' rust/crates/rusty-claude-cli/src/` and cross-check every match against `classify_error_kind` — file follow-up entries for any sentinel that lands in `"unknown"`. **Acceptance check (one-liner):** `claw login --output-format json 2>&1 | jq -e '.kind == "removed_subcommand" and (.hint | type == "string")'` should print `true` (currently `.kind == "unknown"` and `.hint == null` → exit 1). Source: gaebal-gajae dogfood for the 2026-05-24 13:30 Clawhip pinpoint nudge at message `1508099780230906027`. Pre-grep gate filtered 9 hypotheses down to 3 fresh (E=login/logout envelope, F=CLAW_CONFIG_HOME validation, G=skills empty envelope); F deferred to a later tick because it spans 5 distinct silent-failure modes that warrant their own consolidated entry; G confirmed working correctly (no pinpoint). E selected as the tightest single-function fix with the most concrete CI-impact angle.
|
||||
Five-line fix: change `spec.name == command_name` to `spec.name == command_name || spec.aliases.contains(&command_name)`, and use `spec.name` (not `command_name`) when formatting the guidance string so the suggestion always points at the canonical command. Source spec data already exists in `rust/crates/commands/src/lib.rs` — line 248 (`SlashCommandSpec { name: "skills", aliases: &["skill"], … }`), line 232 (`name: "plugin", aliases: &["plugins", "marketplace"]`), line 535 (`name: "approve", aliases: &["yes", "y"]`), line 542 (`name: "deny", aliases: &["no", "n"]`), line 689 (`name: "workspace", aliases: &["cwd"]`). The data is correct; only the lookup helper is wrong. **Why distinct from #119, #127, #117, #108:** #119 covers `claw hooks --help` (bare verb + extra-arg → billable) — `rest.len() != 1` gating. #127 covers `claw <verb> <ANY-EXTRA-ARG>` falling through to Prompt for diagnostic verbs (`doctor`, `status`, `sandbox`) — also extra-arg corruption. #117 covers `-p` greedy positional swallow. #108 covers subcommand typos falling through (`claw doctorr`). **None of these cover slash-command ALIAS lookup failing the canonical-name comparison.** The bug here is even worse than #108: in #108 the unknown verb is genuinely unknown to the system; in #460 the verb IS known (it's a documented alias listed in `--help` as `aliases: /yes, /y` for `/approve`) but the lookup helper for the bare-verb-on-CLI path doesn't consult the alias field. So **the system silently disagrees with itself**: `--help` advertises `/yes` as a valid approval slash command, but `claw yes` (the obvious "use that command from CLI" attempt) burns LLM tokens with no warning. **Why this matters:** (1) **`claw yes`, `claw no`, `claw cwd`, `claw marketplace` burn billable tokens with provider keys configured.** Same silent-token-burn pathology as #108 and #117, but specifically for documented slash-command aliases. (2) **`/help` output explicitly advertises these aliases:** `/skills [list|install <path>|help|<skill> [args]] List, install, or invoke available skills (aliases: /skill)` — and `/approve Approve a pending tool execution (aliases: /yes, /y)` and `/deny Deny a pending tool execution (aliases: /no, /n)`. A user reads `--help`, sees `/yes` exists, types `claw yes` to try the CLI invocation, and gets a credentials error or token burn. **Documentation contract violated.** (3) **The "did you mean" suggestions for the alias-fallthrough cases (`y`/`n`) are nonsense.** `claw y` suggests `system-prompt` (no relationship). `claw n` suggests `init, agents, sandbox` (no relationship). The levenshtein-style ranker is matching prefix/substring with no understanding that `y` is an `/approve` alias. (4) **System self-inconsistency:** REPL slash dispatch correctly resolves `/skill → /skills` via the alias field at `commands/src/lib.rs:248`. Tab-completion (`slash_command_completion_candidates_with_sessions` at `main.rs:8256-8267`) correctly enumerates aliases. Only the **CLI bare-verb-to-slash-guidance helper** misses the alias field — the singular violator in a system that otherwise honors aliases consistently. (5) **`marketplace` is the worst case:** it's neither a typo of any subcommand nor a common shell word — it's specifically a documented `/plugin` alias, and `claw marketplace` is exactly what someone exploring "is there a marketplace command?" would type. Silent token burn with provider keys. **Required fix shape:** (a) **At `main.rs:1135`, extend the lookup:** `slash_command_specs().iter().find(|spec| spec.name == command_name || spec.aliases.contains(&command_name))`. (b) **When formatting the guidance string**, use `spec.name` for the `/<canonical>` suggestion (not the alias), so users are pointed at the canonical form: `"\`claw yes\` is a slash command. Start \`claw\` and run \`/approve\` inside the REPL."`. (c) **Optionally include the alias in the message** for clarity: `"\`claw yes\` is the \`/approve\` slash command alias. Start \`claw\` and run \`/approve\` inside the REPL."`. (d) **Add a `claw doctor` self-check** that enumerates `slash_command_specs()`, walks every `aliases[]` entry, and asserts that `bare_slash_command_guidance(alias)` returns `Some(_)` for each. This is a one-loop regression catch that prevents future alias additions from silently regressing. (e) **Regression coverage**: matrix table above as a parameterized test — for each row marked ❌, assert the actual response includes `"is a slash command"` and references the canonical command name. **Acceptance check (one-liner):** `for v in skill marketplace yes y no n cwd; do out=$(claw $v --output-format json </dev/null 2>&1 | head -1); echo "$out" | grep -q 'is a slash command' || echo "MISS: $v → $out"; done` should print no MISS lines. Source: gaebal-gajae dogfood follow-up for the 2026-05-24 10:30 Clawhip pinpoint nudge at message `1508054486134947951`.
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user