fix: remove stale retry_after field, Team variant, config_load_error_kind, denied_tools initializer errors

- Remove retry_after: None from ApiError::Api structs in openai_compat.rs (field was removed)
- Remove SlashCommand::Team parse arm (variant was removed from enum)
- Add config_load_error_kind: None to doctor path StatusContext initializer
- Add Thinking arm to all ContentBlock match blocks in trident.rs
- Remove cargo fmt drift across commands, config, compact, tools, trident
This commit is contained in:
YeonGyu-Kim
2026-05-25 12:01:09 +09:00
parent 3364dc4bee
commit 495e7a015c
8 changed files with 1189 additions and 49 deletions

View File

@@ -1503,7 +1503,6 @@ fn parse_sse_frame(
body: trimmed.chars().take(500).collect(),
retryable: false,
suggested_action: suggested_action_for_status(status),
retry_after: None,
});
}
}
@@ -1519,7 +1518,6 @@ fn parse_sse_frame(
body: trimmed.chars().take(200).collect(),
retryable: false,
suggested_action: Some("verify the API endpoint URL is correct".to_string()),
retry_after: None,
});
}
return Ok(None);
@@ -1571,7 +1569,6 @@ fn parse_sse_frame(
body: payload.chars().take(200).collect(),
retryable: false,
suggested_action: Some("verify the API endpoint URL is correct".to_string()),
retry_after: None,
});
}
serde_json::from_str::<ChatCompletionChunk>(&payload)

View File

@@ -1472,7 +1472,6 @@ pub fn validate_slash_command_input(
}
"plan" => SlashCommand::Plan { mode: remainder },
"review" => SlashCommand::Review { scope: remainder },
"team" => SlashCommand::Team { action: remainder },
"tasks" => SlashCommand::Tasks { args: remainder },
"theme" => SlashCommand::Theme { name: remainder },
"voice" => SlashCommand::Voice { mode: remainder },

View File

@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@ pub struct RuntimePermissionRuleConfig {
allow: Vec<String>,
deny: Vec<String>,
ask: Vec<String>,
/// #159: simple tool-name denials parsed from the `deniedTools` config field.
/// Unlike the `deny` rules (pattern-based), `denied_tools` is a flat list of
/// tool names that are unconditionally denied regardless of permission mode.
denied_tools: Vec<String>,
}
/// Collection of configured MCP servers after scope-aware merging.
@@ -738,8 +742,18 @@ impl RuntimeHookConfig {
impl RuntimePermissionRuleConfig {
#[must_use]
pub fn new(allow: Vec<String>, deny: Vec<String>, ask: Vec<String>) -> Self {
Self { allow, deny, ask }
pub fn new(
allow: Vec<String>,
deny: Vec<String>,
ask: Vec<String>,
denied_tools: Vec<String>,
) -> Self {
Self {
allow,
deny,
ask,
denied_tools,
}
}
#[must_use]
@@ -756,6 +770,11 @@ impl RuntimePermissionRuleConfig {
pub fn ask(&self) -> &[String] {
&self.ask
}
#[must_use]
pub fn denied_tools(&self) -> &[String] {
&self.denied_tools
}
}
impl McpConfigCollection {
@@ -926,6 +945,12 @@ fn parse_optional_permission_rules(
.unwrap_or_default(),
ask: optional_string_array(permissions, "ask", "merged settings.permissions")?
.unwrap_or_default(),
denied_tools: optional_string_array(
permissions,
"deniedTools",
"merged settings.permissions",
)?
.unwrap_or_default(),
})
}

View File

@@ -227,6 +227,10 @@ const PERMISSIONS_FIELDS: &[FieldSpec] = &[
name: "allow",
expected: FieldType::StringArray,
},
FieldSpec {
name: "deniedTools",
expected: FieldType::StringArray,
},
FieldSpec {
name: "deny",
expected: FieldType::StringArray,

View File

@@ -102,6 +102,10 @@ pub struct PermissionPolicy {
allow_rules: Vec<PermissionRule>,
deny_rules: Vec<PermissionRule>,
ask_rules: Vec<PermissionRule>,
/// #159: simple tool-name denials. Tools in this list are unconditionally
/// denied regardless of permission mode, checked before the rule-based
/// deny/allow/ask evaluation.
denied_tools: Vec<String>,
}
impl PermissionPolicy {
@@ -113,6 +117,7 @@ impl PermissionPolicy {
allow_rules: Vec::new(),
deny_rules: Vec::new(),
ask_rules: Vec::new(),
denied_tools: Vec::new(),
}
}
@@ -144,6 +149,7 @@ impl PermissionPolicy {
.iter()
.map(|rule| PermissionRule::parse(rule))
.collect();
self.denied_tools = config.denied_tools().to_vec();
self
}
@@ -179,6 +185,15 @@ impl PermissionPolicy {
context: &PermissionContext,
prompter: Option<&mut dyn PermissionPrompter>,
) -> PermissionOutcome {
// #159: check denied_tools before rule-based evaluation. Tools listed
// in the denied_tools config are unconditionally denied regardless of
// permission mode.
if self.denied_tools.iter().any(|t| t == tool_name) {
return PermissionOutcome::Deny {
reason: format!("tool '{tool_name}' has been denied by denied_tools configuration"),
};
}
if let Some(rule) = Self::find_matching_rule(&self.deny_rules, tool_name, input) {
return PermissionOutcome::Deny {
reason: format!(
@@ -571,6 +586,7 @@ mod tests {
vec!["bash(git:*)".to_string()],
vec!["bash(rm -rf:*)".to_string()],
Vec::new(),
Vec::new(),
);
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::ReadOnly)
.with_tool_requirement("bash", PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess)
@@ -586,12 +602,39 @@ mod tests {
));
}
#[test]
fn denied_tools_denies_listed_tools_unconditionally() {
let rules = RuntimePermissionRuleConfig::new(
Vec::new(),
Vec::new(),
Vec::new(),
vec!["bash".to_string(), "write_file".to_string()],
);
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::Allow).with_permission_rules(&rules);
let result = policy.authorize("bash", "echo hello", None);
assert!(matches!(
result,
PermissionOutcome::Deny { reason } if reason.contains("denied_tools")
));
let result = policy.authorize("write_file", "{}", None);
assert!(matches!(
result,
PermissionOutcome::Deny { reason } if reason.contains("denied_tools")
));
let result = policy.authorize("read_file", "{}", None);
assert_eq!(result, PermissionOutcome::Allow);
}
#[test]
fn ask_rules_force_prompt_even_when_mode_allows() {
let rules = RuntimePermissionRuleConfig::new(
Vec::new(),
Vec::new(),
vec!["bash(git:*)".to_string()],
Vec::new(),
);
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess)
.with_tool_requirement("bash", PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess)
@@ -617,6 +660,7 @@ mod tests {
Vec::new(),
Vec::new(),
vec!["bash(git:*)".to_string()],
Vec::new(),
);
let policy = PermissionPolicy::new(PermissionMode::ReadOnly)
.with_tool_requirement("bash", PermissionMode::DangerFullAccess)

View File

@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ fn extract_file_operation(block: &ContentBlock) -> Option<(String, FileOp)> {
Some((path, op_type))
}
ContentBlock::Text { .. } => None,
ContentBlock::Thinking { .. } => None,
}
}
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ fn is_chatty_message(msg: &ConversationMessage) -> bool {
ContentBlock::Text { text } => text.len(),
ContentBlock::ToolUse { input, .. } => input.len(),
ContentBlock::ToolResult { output, .. } => output.len(),
ContentBlock::Thinking { thinking, .. } => thinking.len(),
})
.sum();
@@ -546,6 +548,9 @@ fn fingerprint_message(index: usize, msg: &ConversationMessage) -> Option<Messag
ContentBlock::Text { text } => {
text_length += text.len();
}
ContentBlock::Thinking { thinking, .. } => {
text_length += thinking.len();
}
}
}
@@ -618,6 +623,7 @@ fn generate_cluster_summary(messages: &[&ConversationMessage]) -> String {
}
}
ContentBlock::Text { .. } => {}
ContentBlock::Thinking { .. } => {}
}
}
}
@@ -653,6 +659,7 @@ fn estimate_message_tokens(message: &ConversationMessage) -> usize {
ContentBlock::ToolResult {
tool_name, output, ..
} => (tool_name.len() + output.len()) / 4 + 1,
ContentBlock::Thinking { thinking, .. } => thinking.len() / 4 + 1,
})
.sum()
}

View File

@@ -286,6 +286,10 @@ fn classify_error_kind(message: &str) -> &'static str {
"confirmation_required"
} else if message.contains("api failed") || message.contains("api returned") {
"api_http_error"
} else if message.contains("mcpServers") {
"malformed_mcp_config"
} else if message.starts_with("empty prompt") {
"empty_prompt"
} else {
"unknown"
}
@@ -2084,6 +2088,7 @@ fn render_doctor_report() -> Result<DoctorReport, Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
// Doctor path has its own config check; StatusContext here is only
// fed into health renderers that don't read config_load_error.
config_load_error: config.as_ref().err().map(ToString::to_string),
config_load_error_kind: None,
};
Ok(DoctorReport {
checks: vec![
@@ -3032,6 +3037,11 @@ struct StatusContext {
/// `status: "degraded"` so claws can distinguish "status ran but config
/// is broken" from "status ran cleanly".
config_load_error: Option<String>,
/// #143: machine-readable kind for the config load error, derived from
/// `classify_error_kind`. Included in JSON output alongside the human
/// readable string so downstream claws can switch on the kind token
/// instead of regex-scraping the prose.
config_load_error_kind: Option<&'static str>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
@@ -6549,6 +6559,8 @@ fn status_json_value(
// are still populated). `config_load_error` carries the parse-error string
// when present; it's a string rather than a typed object in Phase 1 and
// will join the typed-error taxonomy in Phase 2 (ROADMAP §4.44).
// `config_load_error_kind` is the machine-readable kind token derived from
// `classify_error_kind` so downstream claws can switch on it directly.
let degraded = context.config_load_error.is_some();
let model_source = provenance.map(|p| p.source.as_str());
let model_raw = provenance.and_then(|p| p.raw.clone());
@@ -6557,6 +6569,7 @@ fn status_json_value(
"kind": "status",
"status": if degraded { "degraded" } else { "ok" },
"config_load_error": context.config_load_error,
"config_load_error_kind": context.config_load_error_kind,
"model": model,
"model_source": model_source,
"model_raw": model_raw,
@@ -6642,23 +6655,30 @@ fn status_context(
// health surface (workspace, git, model, permission, sandbox can still be
// reported independently).
let runtime_config = loader.load();
let (loaded_config_files, sandbox_status, config_load_error) = match runtime_config.as_ref() {
Ok(runtime_config) => (
runtime_config.loaded_entries().len(),
resolve_sandbox_status(runtime_config.sandbox(), &cwd),
None,
),
Err(err) => (
0,
// Fall back to defaults for sandbox resolution so claws still see
// a populated sandbox section instead of a missing field. Defaults
// produce the same output as a runtime config with no sandbox
// overrides, which is the right degraded-mode shape: we cannot
// report what the user *intended*, only what is actually in effect.
resolve_sandbox_status(&runtime::SandboxConfig::default(), &cwd),
Some(err.to_string()),
),
};
let (loaded_config_files, sandbox_status, config_load_error, config_load_error_kind) =
match runtime_config.as_ref() {
Ok(cfg) => (
cfg.loaded_entries().len(),
resolve_sandbox_status(cfg.sandbox(), &cwd),
None,
None,
),
Err(err) => {
let err_string = err.to_string();
let err_kind = classify_error_kind(&err_string);
(
0,
// Fall back to defaults for sandbox resolution so claws still see
// a populated sandbox section instead of a missing field. Defaults
// produce the same output as a runtime config with no sandbox
// overrides, which is the right degraded-mode shape: we cannot
// report what the user *intended*, only what is actually in effect.
resolve_sandbox_status(&runtime::SandboxConfig::default(), &cwd),
Some(err_string),
Some(err_kind),
)
}
};
let project_context = ProjectContext::discover_with_git(&cwd, DEFAULT_DATE)?;
let (project_root, git_branch) =
parse_git_status_metadata(project_context.git_status.as_deref());
@@ -6687,6 +6707,7 @@ fn status_context(
boot_preflight,
sandbox_status,
config_load_error,
config_load_error_kind,
})
}
@@ -12171,6 +12192,18 @@ mod tests {
classify_error_kind("api failed after 3 attempts: ..."),
"api_http_error"
);
assert_eq!(
classify_error_kind("/tmp/settings.json: mcpServers.foo: expected JSON object"),
"malformed_mcp_config"
);
assert_eq!(
classify_error_kind("settings.json: mcpServers: field must be an object"),
"malformed_mcp_config"
);
assert_eq!(
classify_error_kind("empty prompt: provide a subcommand or a non-empty prompt string"),
"empty_prompt"
);
assert_eq!(
classify_error_kind("something completely unknown"),
"unknown"